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THE TRANSGENDER MILITARY BAN:
PRESERVATION OF DISCRIMINATION
THROUGH TRANSFORMATION
Michele Goodwin & Erwin Chemerinsky
ABSTRACT—This Essay contends that the Trump Administration’s ban on
transgender individuals serving in the military is based on prejudice and bias,
lacking any legitimate justification. As such, the transgender military ban
cannot be justified on legal grounds. Nor can it be justified based on health
and safety. Engaging a robust empirical record, the authors show that the ban
cannot be justified based on matters of efficiency, preparedness, or combat
readiness—arguments used by the Trump Administration to justify the ban.
Despite transgender individuals serving openly in the military in recent
years, the Trump Administration has not been able to offer in reports or court
documents proof of its claims that transgender service members undermine
combat readiness and thus pose a risk to the military.
Given this, the authors argue, the Supreme Court’s intervention to lift
the preliminary injunctions bodes poorly for how the Court will address this
issue and other LGBTQ rights issues to come. The Essay identifies several
problems with the Trump Administration’s policy to ban transgender
individuals from serving in the U.S. military. First, the policy is unjustifiably
discriminatory on the basis of gender identity. Second, it perpetuates harmful
stereotypes and stigmas that have serious consequences in society generally,
and specifically, for transgender service members and their families. Third,
the policy singles out transgender members of the military through what
ultimately can be understood as coercion and shaming, forcing trans military
service members to obtain a psychological diagnosis of gender dysphoria
and to do so rather abruptly in order to continue in their military employment.
The Essay shows how the transgender military ban perpetuates historical
patterns of discrimination in the military, which reach back to race- and sexbased discrimination. The authors conclude that promoting equality in the
military will only occur when those who wish to, and are qualified to, serve
are permitted to do so with dignity and respect.
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INTRODUCTION
Without any explanation, on January 22, 2019, the United States
Supreme Court, in a 5–4 ruling split along ideological lines, allowed
President Trump’s ban on military service by transgender individuals to go
into effect.1 In a highly unusual procedural move, the Court’s conservative
1 Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan “would deny the application[s],” but they were
in the minority. Trump v. Karnoski, 139 S. Ct. 950, 950 (2019) (mem.); see Trump v. Stockman, 139 S.
Ct. 950, 950 (2019) (mem.) (“[The] [a]pplication for stay presented to Justice Kagan and by her referred
to the Court [is] granted, and the District Court’s December 22, 2017 order granting a preliminary
injunction is stayed pending disposition of the Government’s appeal in the United States Court of Appeals
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majority, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and
Kavanaugh, granted applications to stay district court orders blocking
implementation of the ban, even though the district court decisions did not
conflict with any prior rulings of the Supreme Court or courts of appeals.
The Supreme Court usually denies review of interlocutory orders while it
“await[s] final judgment in the lower courts before exercising [its] certiorari
jurisdiction.”2
The Court’s ruling was also unusual because the government had not
presented any evidence that allowing transgender individuals to serve in the
military harms military effectiveness, readiness, or lethality.3 In fact,
transgender military members have served openly since an Obama
Administration policy was implemented in 2016.4 Rather, President Trump’s
policy was part of a series of attacks on LGBTQ rights launched shortly after
his taking office.5 Barring transgender individuals from serving in the U.S.
military is chief among them, although it is not the only sphere in which the
Trump Administration has sought to limit or fully eradicate civil rights
protections for LGBTQ persons.6
for the Ninth Circuit and disposition of the Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is
sought.”).
2 Virginia Military Inst. v. United States, 508 U.S. 946, 946 (1993) (Scalia, J., respecting the denial
of certiorari) (citations omitted).
3 See Brief in Opposition at 18, Trump v. Doe 2, 139 S. Ct. 946 (2019) (mem.) (No. 18-677) (“Nor
is there any pressing need for the extraordinary disposition the government requests. . . . But there is no
harm—much less immediate harm—to the military from allowing the service of transgender individuals
who satisfy the demanding standards to which all servicemembers are subject. The preliminary injunction
maintains the status quo that existed prior to the 2017 Presidential Memorandum and that requires
transgender servicemembers to meet the same fitness, readiness, and deployability standards as all other
servicemembers. Although transgender men and women have been serving openly in the military under
the Carter Policy for more than two years, the government has presented no evidence that their doing so
harms military readiness, effectiveness, or lethality.”).
4 Memorandum from Ash Carter, Sec’y of Def., to Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts et al., Military
Service of Transgender Service Members (June 30, 2016), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/
features/2016/0616_policy/DTM-16-005.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5HT-EKKM].
5 The open service policy under the Obama administration in and of itself does not prove a lack of
military harms (although reports relied on by that administration support this conclusion). Rather it
highlights that the Trump administration had the opportunity to gather evidence showing why the ban is
justified but did not find such evidence to justify its discriminatory policy.
6 As of the writing of this Essay, the Trump Administration has formally proposed undoing various
safeguards implemented during the Obama Administration. These protections and civil rights “banned
discrimination against transgender medical patients and health insurance customers.” Abby Goodnough
et al., Trump Administration Proposes Rollback of Transgender Protections, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/24/us/politics/donald-trump-transgender-protections.html
[https://perma.cc/K5TB-4MNG]; see also Establishment of a White House Faith and Opportunity
Initiative, Exec. Order No. 13831, 83 Fed. Reg. 20715 (May 8, 2018) (amending Executive Order 13279,
Equal Protection of the Laws for Faith-Based and Community Organizations, to loosen restrictions on
the ability of religious charities receiving federal funds to preach to those whom they serve); see also
Brief for the Federal Respondent Supporting Reversal , R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC,
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The ban, originally conveyed through a series of tweets in July 2017,
claimed transgender military service members constrained the armed forces,
causing economic hardships that burdened defense efforts. President Trump
tweeted, “Our military must be focused on decisive and
overwhelming . . . victory and cannot be burdened with the tremendous
medical costs and disruption that transgender [sic] in the military would
entail.”7
At the time of these tweets, the President claimed to have consulted
with “[g]enerals and military experts”8 in reaching the decision that the
United States “will not accept or allow” “[t]ransgender individuals to serve
in any capacity in the U.S. [m]ilitary.”9 Whether the President had actually
consulted with experts in 2017, and what they might have actually conveyed,
is unclear and unknown. However, in the months that followed, memoranda
issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense,10 as well as a Department of
Defense Report and Recommendation on Military Service by Transgender
Persons issued by General James Mattis,11 furthered the Trump
Administration’s policy on transgender service members.
Within eighteen months of President Trump’s tweets, a forceful
Directive-type Memorandum (DTM) was issued for the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretaries of Defense, the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense,
and the directors of the Defense Agencies, among others, further articulating
the Trump Administration’s policy related to transgender service members.
The directive emphasizes that “transgender Service members or applicants
for accession to the Military Services must be subject to the same standards
as all other persons.”12 Sadly, historically in the U.S. military, the “standard
No. 18-107 ((argued Oct. 9, 2018) (a recent Supreme Court case in which the Trump Administration
argued against an interpretation of Title VII that would protect against gender identity-based
discrimination).
7 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:04 AM), https://twitter.com/
realdonaldtrump/status/890196164313833472 [https://perma.cc/CJ25-4Z8D]; Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:08 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/
status/890197095151546369 [https://perma.cc/6467-F4DQ].
8 Donald
J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 5:55 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/890193981585444864 [https://perma.cc/8RHU-C2Y4].
9 Id.; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:04 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/890196164313833472 [https://perma.cc/SHW9-4HW6].
10 See, e.g., Interim Guidance on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, Office of the Sec’y of
Def. (Sept. 14, 2017); Memorandum from David L. Norquist, Performing the Duties of the Deputy Sec’y
of Def., to Chief Mgmt. Officer of the Dep’t of Def. et al., Military Service by Transgender Persons and
Persons with Gender Dysphoria (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/
DD/issuances/dtm/DTM-19-004.pdf?ver=2019-03-13-103259-670 [https://perma.cc/AG48-E85N].
11 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MILITARY SERVICE BY TRANSGENDER
PERSONS 19 (Feb. 22, 2018) [hereinafter MATTIS POLICY] .
12 Norquist, supra note 10, at 2.
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service member” excluded people of color, women, and LGBTQ persons,
and discriminatory policies against those communities were justified in
similar ways.
As we articulate in this Essay, the Supreme Court’s decision to lift the
district court injunctions allows unjustified discrimination against
transgender individuals and likely signals a significant shift in the Court’s
position on LGBTQ issues. For many LGBTQ advocates, the Supreme
Court’s decision was a stunning defeat, particularly in light of a line of Court
decisions advancing same-sex equality. Yet, the constitutional gains related
to sex equality (between men and women) and LGBTQ equality, particularly
as evidenced through Supreme Court victories, may obscure an increase in
discrimination yet to come with a divided Court that splits along ideological
lines. We predict that, rather than building upon Justice Anthony Kennedy’s
legacy in articulating and advancing rights for LGBTQ persons, the Court’s
decision may signal a new era marked by the preservation of discrimination.
Given this, we warn that recent Supreme Court victories advancing
marriage equality may obscure the Supreme Court’s preservation of
discrimination through transformation. That is, while the Supreme Court has
rejected one form of LGBTQ discrimination in recent years, most notably
marriage inequality, another aspect—the transgender military ban—
becomes legitimized by the Court.13 Indeed, while LGBTQ advocates
heralded the Supreme Court’s rulings in United States v. Windsor14 and
Obergefell v. Hodges15 as throwing off the vestiges and badges of
homophobia, discrimination against those attracted to the same gender, and
the stereotyping of sexual minorities, it appears their celebration was sadly
premature. This, of course, is the result of the election of Donald Trump and
the subsequent shift in the composition of the Supreme Court.

13 We recognize, of course, that discrimination against transgender individuals might be
distinguished by the Court from discrimination against gays and lesbians. Yet, we are skeptical that the
Court will do this. The sitting Justices who were in the majority on marriage equality (Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) dissented from the lifting of the preliminary injunction of the Trump
transgender ban. Compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2591 (2015), with Trump v. Karnoski,
139 S. Ct. 950 (2019) (mem.). The Justices who dissented on marriage equality (Justices Roberts,
Thomas, and Alito) were the majority (joined by Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh). Compare Obergefell,
135 S. Ct. at 2611 (Roberts, J., dissenting), with Karnoski, 139 S. Ct. at 950.
14 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013).
15 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). It is also worth noting that alongside those who
understood these decisions as marking a new day for LGBTQ equality, there were scholars who voiced
nuanced skepticism and doubt. See e.g., Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage
Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1207, 1208 (2016) (expressing concerns that Obergefell’s “veneration of
marriage” could act to diminish and marginalize the constitutional protections of those families that
choose to live outside of the traditional marriage framework).
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This dynamic is what Professor Reva Siegel describes as “preservationthrough-transformation”16—a framework for evaluating status regulation
that she applied to equal protection law. This Essay borrows that framework,
not to evaluate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, as she
does in relation to the regulation of reproductive rights or to study racial
discrimination,17 but rather as a means to analyze and understand the fluidity,
transformation, and endurance of LGBTQ discrimination.
In this Essay, we address the preservation of LGBTQ discrimination
through very recent transformation via the targeting of transgender military
members. For example, a 2016 study by the RAND Corporation,
commissioned by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness and conducted within its Forces and Resources Policy
Center’s National Defense Research Institute, concluded that allowing
transgender individuals to serve in the military would have “minimal impact
on readiness.”18 The study, funded by the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
estimated that out of more than 1.3 million military personnel, there are
roughly between 2,150 and 11,000 transgender individuals in military
service.19
According to the study’s authors, by allowing trans-inclusive medical
care, active-component health care costs increase “spending by only 0.038–
0.054 percent.”20 Using “baseline estimates,” they project that “health care
costs will increase by between $2.4 million and $8.4 million” annually.21 The
RAND Corporation study made clear that there is no reason for excluding
transgender individuals from military service. We share this conclusion.
16 Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing
State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997); see id. at 1119–20 (“White Americans who
emphatically opposed slavery regularly disagreed about what it would mean to emancipate AfricanAmericans. Some defined freedom from slavery as equality in civil rights; others insisted that
emancipating African-Americans from slavery entailed equality in civil and political rights; but most
white Americans who opposed slavery did not think its abolition required giving African-Americans
equality in ‘social rights.’”).
17 Id. at 1113–14.
18 See AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., RAND CORP., ASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF
ALLOWING TRANSGENDER PERSONNEL TO SERVE OPENLY 47 (2016).
19 Id. at 14–17. Actual numbers are not known but rather gleaned from various studies, including a
2014 report published by the Williams Institute on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Law and
Public Policy. That study estimated that over 15,000 transgender individuals were in the reserve forces,
serving in the National Guard, or on active duty. See GARY J. GATES & JODY L. HERMAN, WILLIAMS
INST., TRANSGENDER MILITARY SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2014), https://escholarship.org/
uc/item/1t24j53h [https://perma.cc/56VD-XK27] (“The estimates also suggest that there are more than
134,000 transgender individuals in the US who are veterans or have retired from Guard or Reserve
service.”).
20 See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 18, at 70.
21 Id.
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We find several glaring problems with the Trump Administration’s
policy to ban transgender individuals from serving in the U.S. military. First,
the policy is unjustifiably discriminatory on the basis of gender identity.
Second, it perpetuates harmful stereotypes and stigmas that have serious
consequences in society generally, and specifically, for transgender service
members and their families. Indeed, the policy singles out transgender
members of the military through what ultimately can be understood as
coercion and shaming, forcing trans military service members to obtain a
psychological diagnosis of gender dysphoria and to do so rather abruptly in
order to continue in their military employment.
Yet, the policy not only imposes a distressing ultimatum on transgender
military service members and excludes transgender Americans from serving
in the military but also reifies a social construction of LGBTQ persons being
mentally ill or diseased. That is, in order for military members to comply
with the policy, they must also be subjected to medical diagnoses that
continue to pathologize LGBTQ persons.22
For example, a diagnosis of gender dysphoria, which the military now
associates with transgender service members, is effectively a finding of
mental illness or a personality disorder.23 The military has declared that
gender dysphoria, gender transition treatment, and sex reassignment surgery
are equally disqualifying.24
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM),
which is used by clinicians and psychiatrists to diagnose mental illnesses,
describes a person diagnosed with this condition as associated with having
problems functioning or living under “significant distress.”25
The government’s brief further exposes this stigmatization:
Consistent with the inclusion of “‘transsexualism’” in the DSM, the military’s accession
standards—the “standards that govern induction into the Armed Forces”—had for decades
disqualified individuals with a history of “‘transsexualism’” from joining the military. And
although the military’s retention standards—the “standards that govern the retention and
separation of persons already serving in the Armed Forces”—did not “require” separating
“‘transsexual[]’” servicemembers from service, “‘transsexualism’” was a “permissible basis” for
doing so.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 3, Trump v. Doe 2, 139 S. Ct. 946 (2019) (mem.)
(No. 18-677) (citations omitted).
23 See Ranna Parekh, What Is Gender Dysphoria, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Feb. 2016),
https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-dysphoria
[https://perma.cc/A3XY-78TS] (explaining the DSM fifth edition criteria for gender dysphoria).
24 See Interim Guidance on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, supra note 10; Norquist,
supra note 10, at 2, 7–8. Thus, the government appears to wield the gender dysphoria diagnosis as a
means of rooting out transgender persons who have not medically transitioned.
25 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
452–53 (5th ed. 2013).
22

757

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Our concern, and one that is shared by many LGBTQ advocates, is the
equating of a transgender identity with mental disability, or, specifically, the
characterization of transgender individuals as having a mental disorder. In
this way, the government can disguise its animus toward transgender
individuals as a legitimate military health care concern. For some service
members, this language, and viewing the diagnosis as pathologizing, will be
a significant “disincentive in deciding whether to get the diagnosis [because]
the idea of having such a medical designation in the employment file is
painful.”26 In this case, the military preserves its broader history or legacy of
discrimination against vulnerable communities.27 And more specifically, it
introduces new forms of discrimination against the LGBTQ community by
deploying harmful stereotypes and outdated tropes to prohibit service by
transgender individuals.
This Essay contends that the Trump Administration’s ban on
transgender individuals serving in the military is based on prejudice and bias,
lacking any legitimate justification. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s
intervention to lift the preliminary injunctions bodes poorly for how the
Court will deal with this issue and other LGBTQ rights issues to come. In
this Essay, while our attention turns specifically addressing transgender
discrimination, we also speak to the collective concerns of LGBTQ
communities. In doing so, we point out that the justifications for
discrimination against LGBTQ people have historically been tightly
interwoven around stereotypic perceptions of sex identity.
Our intention is not to conflate the social or legal status(es) of LGBTQ
communities, especially as they are not a monolith. Rather, discrimination
against gay men and women has typically extended to bisexuals and
26 Lauren Hodges & Ailsa Chang, How the Trump Administration’s Transgender Troop Ban Is
Affecting One Military Family, NPR (Apr. 11, 2019, 4:49 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/
11/711229419/how-the-trump-administrations-transgender-troop-ban-is-affecting-one-military-fa
[https://perma.cc/WQ5U-RSYB].
27 Historically, the United States military has discriminated against African Americans by imposing
quotas, forced segregation, unequal benefits and later imposed quotas on women in military services. The
institutionalized racism spread beyond the combat field to the defense industries in the United States,
which redlined African Americans out of military-related jobs in factories where military equipment was
manufactured and tanks built. See generally BERRY, infra note 28; HOPE, infra note 28; PATTON, infra
note 28. See also LISHA B. PENN, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, RECORDS OF
MILITARY AGENCIES RELATING TO AFRICAN AMERICANS FROM THE POST-WORLD WAR I PERIOD TO
THE KOREAN WAR (2006) (providing an empirical account of the discriminatory practices adopted by the
United States Armed Forces to deny Black Americans the opportunity and right to serve in the military).
It was Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Executive Order 8802, known as the Fair Employment Act, issued on June
25, 1941, that sought to further dismantle the institutionalized racism within the military and the broader
defense industries. Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 234 (1941 Supp.). However, these patterns of
discrimination were followed by discrimination against LGBTQ women and men in the military. See
infra, Part I.
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transgender persons. We predict, the Trump Administration’s discrimination
against transgender individuals will not be isolated to them nor contained to
military service. We interpret the Trump Administration’s transgender
military ban as also signaling that gays and lesbians will not be spared from
the harmful retrenchment of their recent political and legal gains.
Part I of this Essay situates the transgender military ban as continuing
the history of military discrimination against LGBTQ individuals. Part II
argues that the transgender military ban is unjustified by any legitimate
purpose, as compellingly articulated by the district courts and as
demonstrated by empirical evidence. Part III then turns to the Supreme
Court, and articulates why the Court’s unusual lifting of the district courts’
injunctions was unjustified, particularly as the Court acted before decisions
from courts of appeals. Finally, Part IV forecasts the Court’s lifting of the
injunctions as signaling a major shift in the Court’s jurisprudence on LGBTQ
issues. Without Justice Kennedy, it contends, the progress made toward
LGBTQ equality may be vulnerable.
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I.

THE LONG ARC OF LGBTQ DISCRIMINATION IN THE MILITARY

Sadly, discrimination in the United States military is nothing new.28 In
fact, race29 and sex30 discrimination in the military have been the subject of
scholarly attention, as well as significant social debate,31 and still more
attention is needed on those issues.32 The cyclical horrors between racially
28 See generally, e.g., MARY FRANCES BERRY, MILITARY NECESSITY AND CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY:
BLACK CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1861–1868 (1977) (describing the role of Blacks in the
military as a means to citizenship); RICHARD O. HOPE, RACIAL STRIFE IN THE U.S. MILITARY: TOWARD
THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION 11–15 (1979); GERALD W. PATTON, WAR AND RACE: THE BLACK
OFFICER IN THE AMERICAN MILITARY, 1915–1941 (1981); see also PENN, supra note 27, at 8 (“The [Air
Force] resisted previous efforts to enlist black airmen with the claim that there were no black pilots in the
United States. Within the War Department and the AAF in general, the belief prevailed that black males
lacked the aptitude to be military pilots. It was not until the passage of the Selective Training and Service
Act of 1940 (and pressure exerted from the black community) that the [Air Force] along with other
military services was required to enlist black males in proportion to their total population (about 10
percent).”)
29 See generally KRISTY N. KAMARCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DIVERSITY, INCLUSION, AND
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE ARMED SERVICES: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 12 (2019)
(documenting a history of racial segregation and discrimination in the United States military, including
that “[d]uring the Civil War, approximately 186,000 black Americans served in the Union Army as part
of sixteen segregated combat regiments, and some 30,000 served in the Union Navy”); James Burk &
Evelyn Espinoza, Race Relations Within the US Military, 38 ANN. REV. SOC. 401 (2012) (finding
persistent patterns of racial disparities in the military that disadvantage racial minorities); Nanette
Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court’s Korematsu and Endo
Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 175 (1945) (describing the more lax judicial review over military
authorities’ discriminatory actions in respect to the Japanese ancestry program during World War II);
Mary C. Griffin, Note, Making the Army Safe for Diversity: A Title VII Remedy for Discrimination in the
Military, 96 YALE L.J. 2082 (1987) (arguing that courts should apply Title VII discrimination protections
to the military).
30 Tim Bakken, A Woman Soldier’s Right to Combat: Equal Protection in the Military, 20 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 271, 271 (2014) (“Through federal policy and its own rules and culture, the U.S.
military has been, and to some extent remains, especially in regard to women, the last government
institution accepting of de jure discrimination. . . . Most prominently, the military prohibited all women
from serving in combat units.”); Robin Rogers, A Proposal for Combatting Sexual Discrimination in the
Military: Amendment of Title VII, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 165 (1990).
31 Theodore R. Johnson, Presidents, Race and the Military, in the 1940s and Now, N.Y. TIMES (July
26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/magazine/military-desegregation-trump-truman.html
[https://perma.cc/8NHE-MQ3Q] (relaying the return home of Tech. Sgt. Isaac Woodard, Jr., who upon
returning home in uniform was literally “blinded” after a mob of white police officers inflicted such a
brutal beating upon him with their batons that he suffered a loss of sight; the officers dumped his broken
body at a nearby veteran’s hospital); see also Nikole Hannah-Jones, Our Democracy’s Founding Ideals
Were False When They Were Written. Black Americans Have Fought to Make Them True, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/black-historyamerican-democracy.html [https://perma.cc/7LB2-DHJZ] (In this autobiographical account, reflecting on
the patriotic reasons why her African American father joined a segregated military and also the cruel
lessons learned, “The Army did not end up being his way out. He was passed over for opportunities, his
ambition stunted. He would be discharged under murky circumstances and then labor in a series of service
jobs for the rest of his life.”).
32 Safia Samee Ali, Black Troops More Likely to Face Military Punishment Than Whites, New Report
Says, NBC NEWS (June 7, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/black-troops-more-likelyface-military-punishment-whites-new-report-n769411 [https://perma.cc/8Q53-VPQ3] (reporting on a
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segregated military service and the sometimes brutal return to civilian life
that confronted Black service members are recorded by the Equal Justice
Initiative (EJI):
Between the end of Reconstruction and the years following World War
II, thousands of black veterans were accosted, assaulted, and attacked,
and many were lynched. Black veterans died at the hands of mobs and
persons acting under the color of official authority; many survived nearlynchings; and countless others suffered severe assaults and social
humiliation. . . . As veteran and later civil rights leader Hosea Williams
said, “I had fought in World War II, and I once was captured by the
German army, and I want to tell you the Germans never were as
inhumane as the state troopers of Alabama.”33
Even while the racial discrimination Black enlisted service members
experienced at home may have surpassed the barrage of assaults that they
experienced in barracks, mess houses, and on military bases, nevertheless,
those conditions within the Army and other military branches were
horrifyingly discriminatory.34
Race discrimination has beset myriad aspects of U.S. military
operations, policies, and practices, from racial segregation of troops to a ten
percent ceiling on the recruitment of African American soldiers,35 to racial
discrimination in the distribution of benefits.36 The United States military
disturbing new study, which spanned nearly ten years of data, finding “Black service members are
significantly more likely to face military punishment than their white colleagues, according to a new
report that alleges rampant racial bias in the military”); Leo Shane III, White Nationalism Remains a
Problem for the Military, Poll Suggests, MILITARY TIMES (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/02/28/white-nationalism-remains-aproblem-for-the-military-poll-shows/ [https://perma.cc/PJ7W-ZLYC] (“After a year of military officials
publicly emphasizing the dangers of white nationalism in the ranks, a poll of Military Times readers found
little change in the prevalence of those racist views among troops. . . . About 22 percent of service
members who participated in the survey last fall said they have seen signs of white nationalism or racist
ideology within the armed forces.”).
33 EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: TARGETING BLACK VETERANS 7, 24 (2017)
https://eji.org/reports/online/lynching-in-america-targeting-black-veterans
[https://perma.cc/9R48UTKD] (“Returning African American veterans were met with a familiar ‘tenacious and violent white
supremacy,’ and their status as veterans made them special targets for white aggression.”)
34 Id. at 7 (For these reasons and more, “[d]ocumenting these atrocities is vital to understanding the
incongruity of our country’s professed ideals of freedom and democracy while tolerating ongoing
violence against people of color within our own borders.”).
35 See KAMARCK, supra note 29, at 12–15; see also Ted Gregory, Forgotten War Nurses Keep Their
Story Alive, CHI. TRIB. (May 28, 2001), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2001-05-280105280153-story.html [https://perma.cc/2SKV-9FEU] (“Army leaders set a quota of 48 [black] nurses,
who were segregated from white nurses and white soldiers for much of [World War II]. . . . They were
nearly invisible in the estimated 52,000-member Army Nurse Corps.”).
36 See generally DONALD R. SHAFFER, AFTER THE GLORY: THE STRUGGLES OF BLACK CIVIL WAR
VETERANS (2004) (examining the obstacles black veterans faced in their attempts to secure equality in
the post-Civil War Era); Sven E. Wilson, Prejudice & Policy: Racial Discrimination in the Union Army
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segregated Asians as well as African Americans.37 By the time of President
Truman’s Executive Order to end racial discrimination in the military,38
“Asian-Americans were no longer serving in segregated units; however,
black units were still segregated.”39 Senior military officials reluctant to the
change made arguments similar to those used now to ban transgender
individuals from serving; they claimed that integrating African Americans in
the military would undermine military efficiency and effectiveness.40 A
racially integrated military, albeit with strict quotas, interrupted the ubiquity
of Jim Crow white supremacy practices and with it undeniable power
asymmetries that unjustifiably subordinated Blacks and privileged whites.
Nor have women been spared discrimination and harmful practices
within the United States military, which has historically restricted their
military service and employment.41 And, sadly, racial discrimination
persisted within the context of sex discrimination, with quotas imposed on
the number of Black women who could serve in the military as nurses.42 In
this regard, the military imposed compounding, onerous, discriminatory
conditions on Black women based on their sex and race.43 Ironically, racism
was used as a proxy or explanation for sexism in denying Black nurses to
serve in the military. Army Medical Corps Colonel C.R. Darnell, claimed
that the difficulty in making sure that Black women would remain segregated
made it impracticable for them to serve, stating, in a letter to a member of
congress, the “difficulty if not impossibility of arranging proper quarters and
messing facilities for them[,] their employment has been found impracticable
in time of peace. You may rest assured that when military conditions make
it practicable . . . to utilize colored nurses they will not be overlooked.”44
In 1948, the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act set a policy
limiting the number of women allowed to serve in each branch of the armed

Disability Pension System, 1865–1906, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S56 (2010) (highlighting the difficulties
black soldiers had in receiving military pensions).
37 See KAMARCK, supra note 29, at 14.
38 Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948).
39 KAMARCK, supra note 29, at 14.
40 Id. at 14–15.
41 Bakken, supra note 30, at 271 (“[N]either Congress nor the Supreme Court has acted to ensure
that women have the right to hold all jobs in the military for which they are qualified.”).
42 Kathryn Sheldon, Brief History of Black Women in the Military, THE WOMEN’S MEMORIAL,
https://www.womensmemorial.org/history-of-black-women [https://perma.cc/V3XD-C9RA] (also
noting, “[e]nlisted women served in segregated units, participated in segregated training, lived in separate
quarters, ate at separate tables in mess halls, and used segregated recreation facilities. Officers received
their officer candidate training in integrated units, but lived under segregated conditions.”)
43 See id.
44 See id.
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services.45 The ceiling was set at two percent.46 Compounding this,
historically, military policies were slow to remedy the discrimination
experienced by its personnel.47 And Congress has been equally plodding in
remedying the patterns, practices, and effects of discrimination in the
military.48 Indeed, even after the military lifted its “blanket exclusion of
women from combat,” it nonetheless “reserved for its commanders the
continued right to exclude women from combat if the commanders could
assert a particular military necessity as a justification.”49 There are striking
parallels between the justifications for race and sex discrimination in the past
and discrimination against transgender individuals under the Trump policy.
A. History of LGBTQ Discrimination in Government and the Military
We highlight the military’s history of discrimination and what some
would argue as its continuing challenges not to blunt its current
discrimination against LGBTQ service members by suggesting that the
military is simply an organization that discriminates. Rather, as scholars have
joined in bringing attention to race and sex discrimination in the military to
redress historic wrongs, their articulations regarding those concerns have in
turn further legitimized the fundamental equality interests of people of color
and women serving or wishing to serve in the military. Similarly, casting
attention on transgender discrimination in the military, serves not only to
highlight its illegitimacy and unconstitutionality, but also give meaning to
the Court’s evolving jurisprudence advancing equality.
As well, there are meaningful lessons to be learned from the racial
integration of the military. According to a RAND Research Brief for the
National Defense Research Institute commissioned by the Secretary of
Defense in 1993:

45 Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-625, § 102, 62 Stat. 356, 357
(1948) (repealed 1967).
46 Id.
47 Griffin, supra note 29, at 2082 (“Discrimination remains a serious problem in the United States
military. As the law stands, however, when an enlistee dons a military uniform, she sheds her right to a
judicial remedy for employment discrimination.”); see also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305
(1983) (“We hold that enlisted military personnel may not maintain a suit to recover damages from a
superior officer for alleged constitutional violations.”).
48 In 1967, Congress finally lifted the restrictions capping the percentage of women who could serve.
Act of Nov. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-130, 81 Stat. 374 (1967). In 2013, the military lifted its ban on women
serving in combat. See Memorandum from Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff &
Leon E. Panetta, Sec’y of Def., to Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts et al. (Jan. 24, 2013),
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/WISRJointMemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJ73-CFN5].
49 Bakken, supra note 30, at 272 (citing Dempsey & Panetta, supra note 48).
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While a decision to integrate homosexuals into the force is not directly
comparable to the integration of blacks into the military, the experience
of racial integration provides insights into the military’s ability to adapt
to change. That experience shows that it is possible to change how troops
behave toward previously excluded (and despised) minority groups,
even if underlying attitudes toward those groups change very little.50
This observation is particularly relevant because “[w]hen integration
was mandated in the late 1940s,” many government officials believed it was
“inconsistent with prevailing societal norms and likely to create tensions and
disruptions in military units and to impair combat effectiveness.”51 To place
this in context, Conrad Crane, the director of the U.S. Army Military History
Institute, suggests that very few, if any, politicians or military officials
supported President Truman’s plans for military integration.52 And, to be clear,
Truman did not come to this decision on his own; Black civil rights leaders
like A. Philip Randolph pressured the President into action.53 A report
published by The New Republic in 1952 chronicling that period described
that, “[f]our years ago the entire concept of integrating whites and Negroes in
our armed forces was roundly denounced by many politicians and top military
brass among them the Republican Presidential nominee, Gen. Dwight D.
Eisenhower.”54
Nevertheless, as the RAND Research Brief points out, “in the final
years of World War II and especially during the Korean War, integrated
Army units were able to function effectively even in the most demanding
battlefield situations.”55 This demonstrates that despite what government
officials may believe and prevailing social attitudes, integration of
marginalized groups in the military has historically been successful.
50 RAND CORP., CHANGING THE POLICY TOWARD HOMOSEXUALS IN THE U.S. MILITARY (2000),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB7537/index1.html [https://perma.cc/F3LM-RCNV].
51 Id.; see PENN, supra note 27, at 74 (Army Col. E.R. Householder infamously claimed that the
scourge of racism in society was not a problem for the military to solve, observing that the military was
not a laboratory for fixing social problems).
52 Jim Garamone, Historian Charts Six Decades of Racial Integration in U.S. Military, DOD NEWS
(July 23, 2008), https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=50560 [https://perma.cc/Y8EJ9PNC].
53 Theo Lippman Jr., For Truman, Desegregation Order Was a Political Move, BALT. SUN
(Aug. 9, 1998), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1998-08-09-1998221064-story.html
[https://perma.cc/M3Z3-A6RA] (“A. Philip Randolph, head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters,
was insistent in pressing for equal opportunity in enlistments, schooling, promotions, assignments and
retention—and especially in integrating units. In early 1948 he told the president that he would advise
young blacks not to register for the draft if the Army remained segregated.”).
54 Harry Conn, Military Civil Rights: A Report, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 18, 1952),
https://newrepublic.com/article/78402/military-integration-civil-rights-report [https://perma.cc/FF872MYR].
55 RAND CORP., supra note 50.
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Finally, we recognize the value of scholarship that similarly addresses
unjustified discrimination against LGBTQ members of our society who wish
to serve in the military, and more specifically transgender individuals
currently barred from military service. As one commentator has expressed,
“Just as women and African Americans eventually earned their status as
equal members of society and proved their worthiness to serve in the
military, homosexuals are now trying to achieve the same.”56
Even after the U.S. military began the process of addressing segregation
and racial discrimination within its ranks through a 1948 executive order
issued by President Harry Truman,57 the federal government and military
continued to tolerate and perpetuate discrimination against gay service
members. In fact, within only a few short years of Truman’s policy to
advance the civil rights of Black service members and abolish discrimination
on the basis of national origin, religion, color, and race in the military,58
President Dwight Eisenhower signed an executive order explicitly
discriminating against gay men and women.59 The executive order conflated
homosexuality with “sexual perversion” and barred gays from federal
employment, bringing about what became known as the “lavender scare.”60
According to Professor David K. Johnson, the Eisenhower Security Program
sought to intimidate and ferret out gay and lesbian employees.61
This chapter in history has largely been forgotten or overlooked in
public conscience because “[t]he Lavender Scare happened in private.”62
56 G. Dean Sinclair, Homosexuality and the Military: A Review of the Literature, 56 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 701 (2009).
57 Exec. Order No. 9981, supra note 38.
58 Id.
59 Exec. Order No. 10450 § 8(a)(1)(iii), 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (Apr. 27, 1953); see also The Lavender
Scare: How the Federal Government Purged Gay Employees, CBS NEWS (June 9, 2019, 9:08 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-lavender-scare-how-the-federal-government-purged-gayemployees [https://perma.cc/8ABY-NKGW].
60 Exec. Order No. 10450, supra note 59, § 8(a)(1)(iii) (“The investigations conducted pursuant to
this order shall be designed to develop information as to whether the employment or retention in
employment in the Federal service of the person being investigated is clearly consistent with the interests
of the national security. Such information shall relate, but shall not be limited, to . . . [a]ny criminal,
infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess,
drug addiction, or sexual perversion.”); The Lavender Scare, supra note 59.
61 See DAVID K. JOHNSON, THE LAVENDER SCARE: THE COLD WAR PERSECUTION OF GAYS AND
LESBIANS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 120–21 (2006). “The term ‘Lavender Scare’ draws from
‘lavender lads’—the pejorative phrase used by former Sen. Everett Dirksen and other lawmakers to refer
to gay men.” Robbie Gramer, Congress Wants State Department to Reckon with the ‘Lavender Scare,’
FOREIGN POL’Y (May 2, 2019, 3:59 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/02/congress-wants-statedepartment-to-reckon-with-lavender-scare [https://perma.cc/RB54-RPKV].
62 The Lavender Scare, supra note 59. But see Ann Gearan, John F. Kerry Apologizes for State
Department’s Past Discrimination Against Gay Employees, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2017),
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This period is also overlooked because gay men and women were
traumatized into silence given the horrific cruelties carried out by the
government against them, including interrogations by law enforcement and
threats to expose their sexuality to family members.63 The patterns of
discrimination were so thick with malice and coercion that some LGBTQ
persons who worked in government or the military took their own lives.64
Gay service members were court martialed, dishonorably discharged,
and imprisoned when and if their status was revealed.65 The military adopted
its very own scarlet letter, known as the “blue discharge,” which came to be
associated with the removal of gay service members from military service.66
Generally, there were no exceptions nor protections—except when military
enrollment of gay men served to increase the ranks of service members
during times of war.67 Gay men and women were “subjected to constant
discrimination and stigma while trying to do what most heterosexual
individuals take for granted, serving their country.”68
The strategic platform to remove homosexuals from federal
employment resulted in a wide and tragic “purge of gay employees” who
were deemed to be a threat to national security.69 Senator Joseph McCarthy
led the campaign. He claimed that communists “had infested the federal
government” and with them, homosexuals who “must not be handling top-

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/john-f-kerry-apologizes-for-statedepartments-past-discrimination-against-gay-employees/2017/01/09/19eb5434-d6a9-11e6-b8b2cb5164beba6b_story.html [https://perma.cc/77NW-LFDE].
63 The Lavender Scare, supra note 59 (“Even in private homes, gay people were not safe from
investigators. . . . [Professor] Johnson estimates that between 5,000 to 10,000 people were fired or
resigned, and we’ll never know how many didn’t pursue their dreams for fear of exposure.”).
64 Id. (“Drew Ference, the son of immigrants, spoke five languages and was serving in the U.S.
Embassy in Paris when investigators confronted him with evidence that he was gay. Shortly after
confessing, he killed himself. He wasn’t the only one.”).
65 See Sinclair, supra note 56, at 701.
66 It is unclear how many gays and lesbians were discharged during the era of the blue letter;
however, one estimate is that nearly a hundred thousand servicemembers were affected between 1941
and the late 1980s. See ALLAN BÉRUBÉ, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND
WOMEN IN WORLD WAR TWO 276 (1990). Nor were gays alone in experiencing blue letter discharges,
African Americans were also the targets of these discharges. See Melanie Burney, WWII Vet Wants Army
to Upgrade Discriminatory Discharge to “Honorable,” Nearly 75 Years After Expelling Him, PHILA.
INQUIRER (May 3, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/pennsylvania/nelson-henry-army-bluedischarge-military-discharge-petition-20190503.html [https://perma.cc/6T5E-PDWA].
67 Sinclair, supra note 56, at 702 (“Barring and discharging homosexuals from the military has been
sporadic and determinate upon the need for personnel. During World War II, the screening and exclusion
of homosexuals from military service was loosened, but once the demand for personnel diminished the
standards for enlistment tightened.” (citation omitted)).
68 Id. at 701.
69 The Lavender Scare, supra note 59.
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secret material.”70 According to McCarthy, “the pervert is easy prey to the
blackmailer.”71
As a result of President Eisenhower’s executive order and the efforts to
root out gay federal employees, individuals were stalked by investigators,
relentlessly questioned, pressured to inform on others who might be
suspected of being gay, spied upon, even in their homes, and ultimately fired
from their jobs—with little or no recourse.72 As Joshua Howard, a filmmaker
of a documentary about the lavender scare, explains, “[P]eople who were
being fired didn’t want to tell their closest friends and relatives why they had
been fired, because they wanted to stay in the closet” because of the grave
social costs of being outed as gay.73 According to Howard, “[i]f you were
found out to be gay in those years, your life was essentially over,” because
“[y]ou were shunned by society [and] . . . in the workplace.”74
The panic against LGBTQ employees extended far beyond McCarthy’s
tenure, shaping the culture in the government.75 The irrational fears about
gay, lesbian, and bisexual service members in government service and the
military resulted in military discharges. In the case of Bob Cantillion, a Navy
serviceman, he was discharged after being told to report to a police station,
which he did. It was near Christmas, and somehow law enforcement was
alerted that a few gay men were hosting a Christmas party. After admitting
to being homosexual, police pressured him to provide five names of other
gay individuals; he complied, offering names of individuals he believed
“would be least hurt.”76 They were all discharged without the aid of lawyers
or any meaningful due process.
It is unknown how many LGBTQ persons were purged from the
government during the height of the Lavender Scare; however, Professor
Johnson estimates between 5,000 to 10,000 government employees were
either forced or coerced into resigning or terminated from their
employment.77 In 1950, a subcommittee chaired by Senator Clyde Hoey,
known for being a staunch racial segregationist, published a report titled
Employment of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government,

70 Id.
(quoting Joseph McCarthy, U.S. Senator, Remarks to the Ohio County
Republican Women’s Club (Feb. 9, 1952), https://www.marquette.edu/library/archives/
DC/JRM/JRM_1952_Wheeling_excpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/D66U-JTTP])).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
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claiming thousands of “sex perverts” were in federal jobs and needed to be
purged.78 According to the report, Senator Hoey claimed that “[o]ne
homosexual can pollute a Government office.”79 Rarely did anyone attempt
to fight their discriminatory discharge as they were threatened and coerced
with being “outed” to their families. Senator Hoey is credited to some degree
with paving the way for the executive order issued by President Eisenhower,
which not only banned gay employees from work in the federal government,
but also the military.80
Importantly, this culture of fear contributed to two other phenomena.
First, it led federal employees and members of the military to silence and
hide their identities.81 In some sense, this created a social forerunner to the
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t’ Pursue” congressional policy, because there
were absolutely no incentives and every disincentive to reveal one’s
homosexual status in the military.
Second, and even more tragically, the campaign to rid the government
and military of LGBTQ persons resulted in suicides.82 Being abroad did not
spare gay service members or federal employees from being detained and
questioned about their LGBTQ status. Andrew Ference, an administrative
assistant at the American Embassy in Paris, committed suicide after being
detained by State Department security officers who suspected him of being
gay.83 Mr. Ference was questioned for two days, during which he “admitted
homosexual activities” and was made to resign.84 Four days later he killed
himself.85
The shameful past of this type of discrimination is far more recent than
some may think. Until 1969, “congressional appropriations committees
required the State Department to report the number of gay employees fired
each year,” not in an effort to combat discrimination, but as a means to

78

S. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS
Sess. 1950); JOHNSON, supra note 61, at 101–03, 114–18.
79 JOHNSON, supra note 61, at 116 (citing S. DOC. NO. 241, supra note 78, at 4).
80 See id. at 123.
81 See The Lavender Scare, supra note 59.
82 JOHNSON, supra note 61, at 158–59 (“Though clear documentation of only a handful of suicides
exist, the quiet handling of many of the gay interrogations and resignations suggests the possibility of
many more. Washington newspapers from the period contain numerous stories of single male government
workers, often State Department employees, who committed suicide for no known reason.”); see also
Gramer, supra note 61 (“Gay employees were hounded from office in a dark episode of State Department
history from the 1950s and ‘60s, and many committed suicide.”).
83 JOHNSON, supra note 61, at 159.
84 Id.
85 Id.
IN GOVERNMENT, S. DOC. NO. 241 (2d
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further it.86 That is, the goal was to purge gay individuals from government
service and not to protect them from discrimination. Known instances of
individuals purged from government employment were not followed with
advocacy on their behalf. Rather, these purges were perceived as a success.
Moreover, “[a]s recently as the early 1990s, the State Department’s
diplomatic security services investigated employees based on their sexual
orientation,” which was deemed a security risk.87
In recent years, greater social pressure on the government and military
has resulted in a slow chip away of laws and policies that silenced or outright
banned military service among LGBTQ individuals. Specifically, in 1994,
the Clinton Administration issued a policy on military service of gays,
bisexuals, and lesbians known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT).88 The
policy was seen as a compromise and important response to decades of
discrimination against gay military service members.
On one hand, the DADT policy created room for gays and lesbians in
the military, albeit under deeply constrained circumstances. The compromise
was that closeted gay individuals would be able to serve in the military
without fear of harassment and abuse because the policy barred
discrimination against closeted gay service members or applicants. While
this meant gay service members were expected to suppress their identities
and “refrain from any homosexual behavior,” the law was hailed by some
gay rights advocates as a victory.89
However, the DADT law also explicitly discriminated against gay,
lesbian and bisexual service members. For instance, it stated, “[t]he
prohibition against homosexual conduct is a longstanding element of
military law that continues to be necessary in the unique circumstances of
military service.”90 The policy thus barred openly gay individuals from
enlisting in the military and serving.91 It also banned persons who
“demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts,” based on
the unsupported claim that these out homosexuals “would create an
unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline,
and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability.”92

86

Gramer, supra note 61.
Id.
88 Department of Defense Directive 1304.26, Qualification Standards for Enlistment, Appointment,
and Induction 9–11 (Dec. 21, 1993); Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994) (repealed 2010).
89 Sinclair, supra note 56, at 707–08.
90 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(13).
91 Id. § 654(a)(15).
92 Id.
87
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The DADT policy further imposed a gag rule prohibiting gay, lesbian,
and bisexual military service members from speaking about domestic
partnerships, marriage, family status, or other information that might convey
their sexual identity and/or status. Violation of the policy resulted in
discharge.93
Unlike prior military policies, DADT also barred military superiors
from initiating investigations into their subordinates.94 It was a painful
middle ground for some. The DADT policy finally relieved gay service
members from being vulnerable to dishonorable discharge simply for being
gay. Yet, it came at the cost of further stigmatization.
Eventually, during the Obama Administration, Congress repealed the
policy.95 As such, gay and lesbian individuals can now openly serve in the
U.S. military without risk of being discharged for being gay. 96 Gay members
of the armed services may also marry—a protection secured in 2013 when
the Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act.97
B. The Justifications for the Transgender Military Ban Are Identical to
Those Used for Excluding Gays and Lesbians
The justifications for banning transgender individuals from military
service are grounded in stereotypes and stigmas. In this Section, we outline
several reasons why the transgender military ban not only imposes
unjustified discriminatory constraints on transgender individuals who wish
to serve in the military, but also fails to achieve the government’s purported
objectives. The bans are unlikely to make the military more secure or
effective, just as discriminating against African Americans in the military
did not produce a stronger, more effective segregated army. To the contrary,
the addition of African Americans to the military helped to secure the
93

See id. § 654(b)(2).
Review of the Effectiveness of the Application and Enforcement of the Department’s Policy on
Homosexual Conduct in the Military, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Office of the Assistant Sec’y of Def. (Personnel
and
Readiness),
Report
to
the
Sec’y
of
Def.,
(Apr.
2,
1998)
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a353107.pdf [https://perma.cc/56J3-4FLZ] (“[T]he services may
not initiate investigations solely to determine a member’s sexual orientation. Commanders may initiate
an investigation only upon receipt of credible information that a service member has engaged in
homosexual conduct.”).
95 Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–321, 124 Stat. 3515 (2010).
96 While the official language of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy may say “gay and lesbian,”
bisexual individuals suffered similarly to gay and lesbian service members. 10 U.S.C. §654 (1994)
(repealed 2010); DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED
WITH A REPEAL OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” 39 (2010), https://archive.defense.gov/home/features/
2010/0610_dadt/DADTReport_FINAL_20101130(secure-hires).pdf. [https://perma.cc/VG2V-JKNR].
Of course, categorizing individuals as gay and lesbian, as opposed to heterosexual, is imprecise as there
are individuals who are bisexual, pansexual, or otherwise.
97 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (finding Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage
Act to be a due process violation and therefore unconstitutional).
94
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military domestically during the Civil War and abroad in all wars since.
Notions to the contrary were rooted in irrational stereotypes and racial
prejudice, which are identical to those used to discriminate against
transgender individuals today.
1. New Military, Same Old Discrimination
The argument that the military is “weakened” or somehow less “lethal”
by being inclusive is a ruse that has been used to perpetuate discrimination
for a very long time. First, the transgender military ban stems from the same
type of ungrounded, discriminatory rationales put forth decades ago to ban
African Americans, women, and homosexuals from military service. The
military unjustifiably imposed constraints on groups that were marginalized
or legally disenfranchised in society. As such, the military engaged in
perpetuating wrongs and singling out African Americans, women, and
homosexuals of all backgrounds for discriminatory treatment.98 These harms
were not foisted on white, heterosexual men.
The arguments made against racially integrating the military were
exactly like those made by the Trump Administration for excluding
transgender individuals. The arguments made decades ago to justify racial
exclusion and discrimination related to inefficiency, weakening
preparedness, and stereotypes. In his disapproval of President Truman’s
executive order racially desegregating the nation’s armed forces, Army
Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond expressed:
I do not agree that integration improves military efficiency; I believe it
weakens it. I believe that integration was and is a political solution for
the composition of our military forces because those responsible for the
procedures . . . do not understand the characteristics of the two human
elements concerned . . . This is not racism—it is common sense and
understanding. Those who ignore these differences merely interfere with
the combat effectiveness of combat units.99
He was not alone. Other senior military officials resisted President
Truman’s efforts to desegregate the military. The President’s Committee on
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces documented
military leaders “advocat[ing] for maintaining the status quo due to concerns
about inefficiencies that might arise from impaired morale in mixed units.”100

98

See supra notes 28–49.
KAMARCK, supra note 29, at 15 (citation omitted).
100 Id. at 14; see also THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON EQUAL. OF TREATMENT & OPPORTUNITY IN THE
ARMED FORCES, FREEDOM TO SERVE: EQUALITY OF TREATMENT AND OPPORTUNITY IN THE ARMED
SERVICES 15 (1950) [hereinafter FREEDOM TO SERVE].
99
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However, as the Commission chaired by Charles Fahy found, “existing
segregation policies were contributing to inefficiencies through unfilled
billets, training backlogs, and less capable units.”101
Nevertheless, then as well as now, the discrimination perpetuated,
cloaked in the cloth of “military efficiency” and readiness. Senior military
officials claimed that racially integrating the military would interfere with
“combat effectiveness,” despite evidence to the contrary.102
For all the civil rights advancements within the military, it has
continued its discriminatory practices. True, the more explicit forms of
discrimination have given way; for instance, there are no longer ceilings or
caps on the percentage of women who may serve. Yet, military
discrimination against vulnerable groups persists. It has simply transformed.
This dynamic of “preservation-through-transformation”103 produces the
perception of civil rights advancement, while discrimination persists. While
marriage equality helped to further one specific civil right for gay
individuals, there remains great debate within other aspects of government
as to whether the abolition of some impediments to LGBTQ equality should
necessarily confer additional civil, political, and social rights.
In particular, the military’s evolving principles on equality and civil
rights involving gay service members are undermined by the organization’s
continued discrimination against transgender service members and
transgender individuals who wish to enroll. Thus, while discrimination
against gay and lesbian service members in the military is abolished through
the repeal of DADT, the underlying animus persists and shifts to transgender
individuals. This is not a new problem; it is one that persists, though affecting
a different vulnerable class.
In the context of the transgender ban, we note that the government has
failed to produce evidence that the military’s readiness or lethality will be
impaired by the addition of transgender service members.104 Further, the
government has failed to show military vulnerability during the past three
years, despite transgender individuals who have openly served in the military
under Obama-era policies. What remains then, are unjustified stereotypes
101

KAMARCK, supra note 29, at 14; see also FREEDOM TO SERVE, supra note 100, at 67.
KAMARCK, supra note 29, at 14–15.
103 See Siegel, supra note 16, at 1119.
104 Neither the President’s tweets nor the ensuing memorandum issued by his office included specific
statistics showing the supposed costs of transgender service members. See Presidential Memorandum for
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security on Military Service by Transgender
Individuals
(Aug.
25,
2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidentialmemorandum-secretary-defense-secretary-homeland-security [https://perma.cc/UE6K-EDMU]. Not
until the Mattis policy did the government begin to attempt to justify the ban. See MATTIS POLICY, supra
note 11.
102
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and biases, which violate the rights of transgender individuals and ultimately
undermine a stronger and more cohesive military.
2.

Discriminatory Military Policies Undermine Morale and Harm
Military Interests
Rarely has the military acknowledged that its own policies, which
encompass historically entrenched segregation, isolation, and social
hierarchies, are a significant factor in causing and perpetuating the decline
in mental health well-being in the armed services.105 Various commissions to
study the military’s allegations that integration—in terms of race, sex, or
homosexuality—would lead to problematic results for the military have
exposed the falsity, speciousness, and unreliability of the military’s claims.106
To the contrary, what these studies, other data, and accounts from service
members have exposed is that patterns of historic discrimination in the
military undermine the advancement of the military’s purported goals.107 In
other words, military culture and systemic patterns of discrimination within
the military undermine the armed services preparedness by discriminating
against qualified members who wish to serve.
105 See generally Ilan H. Meyer, Minority Stress and Mental Health in Gay Men, 36 J. HEALTH &
SOC. BEHAV. 38 (1995) (explaining that, in a society that favors heterosexuals and projects stigmas and
stereotypes on homosexuals and other minority groups, gay people experience added stress).
106 See FREEDOM TO SERVE, supra note 100, at 67 (“As a result of its examination into the rules,
procedures, and practices of the armed services, both past and present, the Committee is convinced that
a policy of equality of treatment and opportunity will make for a better Army, Navy, and Air Force. It is
right and just. It will strengthen the nation.”); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., OFFICE OF DIVERSITY MGMT. &
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, DOD DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION 2013 SUMMARY REPORT 5 (2013) (urging the
use of “strategic communications” in order to express “the importance of a diverse workforce to leaders
within DOD to ensure everyone in the Department ha[s] challenging and fulfilling career opportunities
that
allow[]
them
to
advance
and
move
up
the
ranks”),
https://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/ODMEO%20Diversity%20and%20Inclusion%20Su
mmary%20Report%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/99HS-2Q29]; THE PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON THE
ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN IN THE ARMED FORCES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (Nov. 15, 1992)
(conducting polls on the roles of women in the U.S. armed services, engaging surveys, conducting
longitudinal studies and, among other things, concluding that many gender-neutral assignment policies,
rather than prior policies, which actually hindered combat readiness, should be adopted). In 1962,
President John F. Kennedy authorized the President’s Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed
Forces. This committee “found that while armed services policies were not discriminatory as written,
there was a need for the military to improve recruitment, assignment, and promotion practices to achieve
equal treatment of black servicemembers.” KAMARCK, supra note 29, at 15–16 (citing THE PRESIDENT’S
COMM. ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE ARMED FORCES, INITIAL REPORT: EQUALITY OF TREATMENT
AND OPPORTUNITY FOR NEGRO MILITARY PERSONNEL STATIONED WITHIN THE UNITED STATES (1963)).
107 See KAMARCK, supra note 29, at 1; MILITARY LEADERSHIP DIVERSITY COMM’N, FROM
REPRESENTATION TO INCLUSION: DIVERSITY LEADERSHIP FOR THE 21ST-CENTURY MILITARY, FINAL
REPORT, at xiii (2011), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11390 [https://perma.cc/E8FR-BCXS] (“The
Armed Forces have not yet succeeded in developing a continuing stream of leaders who are as
demographically diverse as the Nation they serve.”).
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Over fifty years ago, President Truman’s Committee on Equality of
Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces concluded not only that the
inclusion of African Americans in the military did not undermine military
efficiency and readiness but also that the military, through its racially
discriminatory policies, practices, and culture, had created deeply
problematic norms that harmed morale and the very functioning of the
military. In the Committee’s final report, it expressed serious misgivings
about senior military officials’ claims that permitting more African
Americans into the military and removing the ban on integration would harm
morale and lead to military inefficiencies.108
More recently, Professor Ilan Meyer’s research further bears this out
and grounds our concern.109 He explains that prejudice, stigma, and
discrimination “create a stressful social environment that can lead to mental
health problems in people who belong to stigmatized minority groups.”110
This is not a controversial point. However, it is lost in the military’s historic
objections to gays, women, and people of color, and we find it relevant in
thinking about transgender service members.
As Professor Meyer further explains, “[i]f prejudice and discrimination
are legal and widely practiced, they are likely to affect many or all members
of a minority group.”111 Even after experiencing and enduring discrimination
in the military, minority group members are “motivated to ignore evidence
of discrimination through a wish to avoid false alarms that can disrupt social
relations and undermine life satisfaction.”112 What this means is that, even
while experiencing the military’s explicit and implicit discriminatory
policies, “minority groups” may tend to “maximize perceptions of personal
control and minimize recognition of discrimination.”113 In other words, the
108 See e.g., FREEDOM TO SERVE, supra note 100, at 67; KAMARCK, supra note 29, at 14 (“The Fahy
Committee’s final report, released in 1950, expressed serious doubts about military officials’ claims that
integration would negatively affect morale and efficiency, finding instead evidence that existing
segregation policies were contributing to inefficiencies through unfilled billets, training backlogs, and
less capable units.”); see also JON E. TAYLOR, FREEDOM TO SERVE: TRUMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND
EXECUTIVE ORDER 9981, at 104 (2012).
109 Meyer, supra note 105; see also Ilan H. Meyer, Prejudice as Stress: Conceptual and
Measurement Problems, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 262 (2003) [hereinafter Meyer, Prejudice as Stress]
(explaining the difficulties of isolating and quantifying the stressful effect of prejudice from among other
stressors); Ilan H. Meyer, Prejudice, Social Stress, and Mental Health in Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual
Populations: Conceptual Issues and Research Evidence, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 674 (2003) [hereinafter
Meyer, Prejudice, Social Stress, and Mental Health] (conducting a meta-analysis before proposing the
use of a minority stress model to explain the prevalence of mental disorders in LGB populations).
110 Meyer, Prejudice, Social Stress, and Mental Health, supra note 109, at 674–75.
111 Meyer, Prejudice as Stress, supra note 109, at 262.
112 Id. at 263.
113 Id.

774

114:751 (2019)

The Transgender Military Ban

prejudice experienced by minority groups in the military may be far more
intensified than even what people of color, women, or gays have historically
reported.
3. Mental Health Discrimination as Proxy for Status Discrimination
Historically, military officials have turned to “mental health concerns”
as proxies for unjustified status discrimination embedded in official
policies.114 As such the military has disguised its animus-based
discrimination with seemingly plausible justifications framed in medicine
and promoting mental health. In regard to the transgender service ban, the
government has stated that under the Mattis policy, “transgender persons
should not be disqualified from service solely on account of their transgender
status.”115 So why, we ask, are transgender individuals now barred from
enlisting in military service?
The Department of Defense (DoD) claims that the RAND Report failed
to seriously analyze the mental health impacts of transgender individuals
serving in the military. In a report to President Trump, the DoD wrote:
Because of the RAND report’s macro focus, however, it failed to analyze
the impact at the micro level of allowing gender transition by individuals
with gender dysphoria. For example, as discussed in more detail later,
the report did not examine the potential impact on unit readiness,
perceptions of fairness and equity, personnel safety, and reasonable
expectations of privacy at the unit and sub-unit levels, all of which are
114 Sinclair, supra note 56, at 702 (“During the 1940s, the military used psychiatry’s determination
of homosexuality as a mental illness to justify discharging gay soldiers; in the 1950s, homosexuals were
determined to be particularly vulnerable to blackmail . . . . When President Clinton proposed lifting the
military’s ban on homosexuals in 1993, Congress and military leaders emphasized the threat of
undermining unit cohesion.” (citations omitted)); see also Norman Q. Brill, Hospitalization and
Disposition, in 1 NEUROPSYCHIATRY IN WORLD WAR II 236–37 (Med. Dep’t, U.S. Army ed. 1966) (“A
man on his own initiative or because of noticeable difficulty in adjusting might visit or be sent to a
psychiatrist for consultation. When it was ascertained that the basis of the maladjustment was
homosexuality and this was reported to the individual’s commanding officer, the subject usually received
a ‘blue’ discharge. Objections to this harsh practice were raised by many homosexuals whose attempts to
receive help from a medical officer resulted in their being discharged ‘without honor.’ Further, confidence
in medical officers was undermined by the Army requirement that these officers report even those
confidential statements given in a professional consultation. The homosexual was being singled out as a
result of irrational prejudices, even though he was no more responsible for his aberration than the mental
defective was responsible for his central nervous system pathology. World War II data indicate that some
5,500 persons were admitted to hospitals with a diagnosis of ‘pathological sexuality,’ primarily
‘homosexuality.’”).
115 General Mattis became secretary after President Trump announced the transgender ban policy.
The policy articulated in Mattis's 2018 memorandum to the president is more detailed than the president’s
tweets and outright ban. “Mattis policy” is also a shorthand that publications have used to distinguish
from the “Carter policy,” which was the open service policy of the Obama administration. See e.g.,
MATTIS POLICY, supra note 11, at 19 .
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critical to unit cohesion. Nor did the report meaningfully address the
significant mental health problems that accompany gender dysphoria—
from high rates of comorbidities and psychiatric hospitalizations to high
rates of suicide ideation and suicidality—and the scope of the scientific
uncertainty regarding whether gender transition treatment fully remedies
those problems.116
In the early 1940s, the military relied on similar mental health proxies
in the practice of purging gay men from the military and subjecting them to
shameful retribution based on their status, including solitary confinement
and court martial.117 Medical interests served as proxies for unchecked and
brazen homophobia. Sadly, the psychiatric community was complicit in
pathologizing homosexuality as a mental health disorder.118
Because the military concluded that homosexuality was a mental illness
that would undermine military readiness and cohesion, “the Army and Navy
developed new policies for the discharge of homosexual servicemembers
who were not engaged in prohibited behavior.”119 It is important to note that
the military curated an image of gay men as “psychopathic” with
“disorders.”120 After all, gay men in the military did not define themselves or
conduct themselves in such a way. Nor was this consistent with any
documented history of gay men in the military.
In other words, these were not evidence-based assessments presented
by the military. To the contrary, the Crittenden Report, produced by the U.S.
Navy in 1957, refuted the notion that the presence of gay service members
would be disruptive to the armed forces.121 In the report, which was kept

116

Id. at 14.
KAMARCK, supra note 29, at 33–34.
118 Id. at 34 (“In 1952, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) established homosexuality as a
‘sociopathic personality disturbance’ in the first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-I).” (quoting AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS § 320.6 (1st ed. 1952))). This designation was changed to be a “sexual deviation”
in the 1968 edition and removed entirely in 1973 from the manual. KAMARCK, supra note 29, at 34 n.165
(citation omitted); see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS § 302 (2d ed. 1968).
119 KAMARCK, supra note 29, at 34.
120 Id.
121 Shauna Miller, 50 Years of Pentagon Studies Support Gay Soldiers, ATLANTIC (Oct. 20, 2009),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/10/50-years-of-pentagon-studies-support-gaysoldiers/28711 [https://perma.cc/J5U6-QD25] (“The DoD has funded studies on the impact of gay
servicemembers as far back as 1957, when the Navy’s Crittenden Report found ‘no factual data’ to
support the idea that they posed a greater security risk than heterosexual personnel.” (quoting THE
CRITTENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE BOARD APPOINTED TO PREPARE AND SUBMIT
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR THE REVISION OF POLICIES, PROCEDURES
AND DIRECTIVES DEALING WITH HOMOSEXUALS 8 (Mar. 15, 1957))).
117
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secret until its declassification in 1989, military and government officials
state, “[a] third concept which persists without sound basis in fact is the idea
that homosexuals necessarily pose a security risk.”122 Indeed, according to a
government report, there is no historic military record of gay enlisted men
behaving in “sociopathic” ways that caused “disturbances” in the military.
Nevertheless, gay men who did not engage in “prohibited behavior” received
“undesirable discharges.” This was in lieu of “prosecution for sexual acts.”123
According to the report, “[d]ischarge paperwork often indicated the reason
for discharge as . . . sexual psychopath.”124
We see the Trump Administration’s effort to ban transgender
individuals from military service as rooted in the same old, harmful statusbased justifications that ultimately led to the exclusion of homosexuals. The
mental health justifications for rejecting transgender individuals from
serving are nearly identical to the concerns raised about gay service
members. These justifications suggested that homosexuals—and now
transgender individuals—are inherently mentally unstable and as such they
pose a credible threat to the military, which needs to be ready, effective,
cohesive, and lethal. Interestingly, similar justifications were deployed by
senior military officials who desired all-white and all-male armies that
excluded people of color and women.
The Trump Administration’s rationales for excluding transgender
service members are cut from the same cloth and borrow the same logic. In
its brief to the Court, the government states: “Given the unique mental and
emotional stresses of military service, a history of [m]ost mental health
conditions and disorders is automatically disqualifying.”125 The government
then refers to an outdated, 1980 edition of the DSM to state that
“transsexualism” is “listed[] among other disorders.”126 The government
claims, consistent with the DSM identifying “transsexualism” as a disorder,
that it has based its military accession standards on this information and as a
result has “for decades disqualified individuals with a history of
‘transsexualism’ from joining the military.”127 In this way, the Trump

122 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE FORCE MANAGEMENT: DOD’S POLICY ON
HOMOSEXUALITY 5 (June 1992), https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/151963.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YD4VFXK] (quoting THE CRITTENDEN REPORT, supra note 121, at 8).
123 KAMARCK, supra note 29, at 33–34.
124 Id. at 34 (emphasis omitted).
125 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 2 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 3. The term “transsexualism” is no longer used because of its imprecision and its failure to
focus on gender identity. It is a term that was used by medical communities at a time in which LGBTQ
individuals were pathologized by medical providers. See Media Reference Guide–Transgender, GLAAD,
https://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender [https://perma.cc/E25U-6EWC].
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Administration not only reifies outmoded terminologies, but also
discriminatory practices.
Instead, we read the government’s discriminatory policy as being
rooted in stereotypes and animus toward transgender persons, rather than a
response to a credible threat to military interests. This is much like past
presumptions and stereotypes made about individuals attracted to those of
the same gender, who were equally and unjustifiably maligned by being
defined as mentally unstable.
II. THE TRANSGENDER MILITARY BAN IS UNJUSTIFIED BY ANY
LEGITIMATE PURPOSE
Leave no doubt, this is a discriminatory policy, which sadly fits a
broader pattern of government-sanctioned discrimination against LGBTQ
individuals, particularly within the military. In addition to its animus-based
discrimination, the transgender military ban is not justified by any legitimate
purpose.
According to the policy, matters related to medical fitness for duty,
bathrooms, shower facilities, physical fitness, and uniform and grooming
standards “will be subject to the standard, requirement, or policy associated
with their biological sex.”128 Further, the policy provides practically no
consolation for transgender service members already in the military. Simply
put, they may keep their jobs and will not be fired outright. For example,
military service members who “received a diagnosis of gender dysphoria
from, or had such diagnosis confirmed by, a military medical provider” prior
to the DTM will be permitted to continue serving in the military.129 But, as
we explain below, the content and context of this policy will make military
service enormously problematic for these individuals.
At first glance, the policy may seem innocuous. It states: “Service in
the Military Services is open to all persons who can meet the high standards
for military service and readiness without special accommodations” and that
“[a]ll Service members and applicants for accession to the Military Services
must be treated with dignity and respect.”130 The policy even stipulates that
no person will be denied service in the military or subjected to adverse
actions or mistreatment based on that person’s “gender identity.”131
Yet, a closer reading of the DTM makes clear the intent of this policy
is not to promote or advance principles of dignity and equality within the
128
129
130
131
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military or advance military readiness. Nor does the DTM reflect an intent
to advance the safety and security of LGBTQ members of the military.
Rather, the policy codifies the tweets issued by President Trump in 2017,
effectively banning transgender individuals from joining the military and
providing thin protections for those who already serve.132 Indeed, current
transgender service members were essentially presented with an ultimatum:
confirm their transgender status through a licensed mental health provider’s
diagnosis of “gender dysphoria” by April 2019 or leave the military.
Part II first challenges the government’s stance that enlisting
transgender service members will adversely affect the military because of
required trans-specific health care. It then rebuts the government’s argument
that allowing transgender individuals to serve will impact military readiness
and cohesion. Next, we further explain why the Trump Administration’s
transgender military ban is unjustified. In Section A, we explain that it
creates a health care cost double standard. Section B debunks the notion that
transgender individuals undermine military readiness. In Section C, we
canvas lessons from abroad. We conclude by articulating why the
transgender military ban violates constitutional rights.
A. Health Care Costs and Double Standards
The government claims that given the significant distress and
“impairment[s]” associated with being transgender, service members that
identify as such might need or seek treatments that involve “psychotherapy,”
sex-reassignment surgery, or cross-sex hormone therapy.133 We acknowledge
the government’s interest in forging a ready, cohesive, and effective military
as well as the armed forces’ interest in establishing a demanding standard.
However, the Trump Administration has not shown evidence that these
principles are undermined by enlisting transgender persons in the military or
by transgender persons utilizing health care while in the military. Nor has a
persuasive, empirically based argument been made to support the claim that
by permitting transgender individuals to serve the military, the armed forces
will suffer significant economic constraints. Thus, we find the government’s
claims to be ungrounded and lacking legitimate justification.
First, of the 1.3 million active component service members in the
military, likely around 6,600 are transgender active service members.134
132

See Donald J. Trump, supra note 7.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 3–4; see also Donald J. Trump, supra note 7.
134 RAND CORP., ASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALLOWING TRANSGENDER PERSONNEL TO
SERVE OPENLY, KEY FINDINGS (2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1530.html
[https://perma.cc/SD5M-R5KD].
133
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Second, only a subset of these transgender service members will seek related
treatment. Accordingly, the RAND Report indicates that each year as few as
29 and at most “129 service members in the active component will seek
transition-related care that could disrupt their ability to deploy.”135
Furthermore, the DoD health care budget for fiscal year 2018 was $53.6
billion,136 while the relative expenditures related to treatments for
transgender service members are miniscule in comparison. Services for
transgender service members totaled under $8 million from July 1, 2016
(when the Obama Administration lifted the ban) to February 1, 2019.137 This
spending accounted for coverage related to hormone prescriptions,
psychotherapy, and surgeries. Psychotherapy accounted for nearly $6
million of the total spending, while surgery accounted for nearly $2
million.138
Moreover, that transgender enlistees might seek medical or
psychological services while in the military is no more disqualifying than
heterosexuals seeking services to address their physical, mental, and sexual
health. Health is a private matter. Transgender service members should no
more be singled out for discriminatory treatment because of their use of
available military health services than women who use birth control,
heterosexual men who experience impotence, combat officers who seek
psychological services, or amputees who receive prostheses. The military
cannot and should not single out one category of service members for the
denial of benefits while providing a range of related services to others. And
certainly, military readiness cannot legitimately serve as a justification for
this discrimination.
According to the RAND Report, even if all transgender service
members utilize the health care benefits they would be entitled to, the costs
related to their care would be “[r]elatively [l]ow.”139 The costs of extending
gender transition-related health care coverage to transgender personnel are
estimated to “increase by between $2.4 million and $8.4 million annually,
representing a 0.04- to 0.13-percent increase in active-component health care

135

Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., EVALUATION OF THE TRICARE PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR 2018 REPORT TO
CONGRESS: ACCESS, COST, AND QUALITY DATA THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 6 (2018).
137 Tom Vanden Brook, Exclusive: Pentagon Spent Nearly $8 Million to Treat 1,500 Transgender
Troops Since 2016, USA TODAY (Feb. 27, 2019, 12:00 AM, updated 4:01 PM), https://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/politics/2019/02/27/exclusive-report-shows-8-million-spent-more-than-1-500transgender-troops-pentagon-dysphoria/2991706002 [https://perma.cc/HS5F-QYJN].
138 Id.
139 RAND CORP., supra note 135.
136
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expenditures.”140 Finally, as the 2016 RAND study reports, “[o]nly a subset”
of transgender service members “will seek gender transition-related
treatment.”141 Even though estimates derive from survey data and private
health insurance claims, that data shows that annually, as few as 29 and as
many as 129 service members in active duty will even seek transition-related
health care which might disrupt their ability to deploy.142 Notably, the
military is not opposed to expending significant financial resources to
address medical conditions related to sex, sexual health, or sexual identity so
long—it seems—as its resources relate to heterosexual males.
Our research finds the sexual health related costs associated with
heterosexuals who seek and receive services while in the military to address
erectile dysfunction further illumes this point.143 The military places
significant value on its response to this issue by spending over $70 million
dollars per year to address it. According to the Mayo Clinic, this condition
may “cause stress, affect . . . self-confidence and contribute to relationship
problems.”144 It is also associated with risk factors such as anxiety,
depression, and other mental health conditions.145 The Mayo Clinic states that
erectile dysfunction “can also be a sign of an underlying health condition that
needs treatment and a risk factor for heart disease.”146
The military’s spending on erectile dysfunction medical care for
heterosexual men demonstrates that the military has the capacity, is willing
to, and does pay for sex-related healthcare. This is not a surprise nor is it
necessarily an unjustified use of military spending, especially given the
enormous value each service member brings to the military. However, it is
relevant, in light of the military’s purported justifications for denying
enlistment to transgender servicemembers based on medical care cost
arguments—specifically grounded in sexual healthcare—that the military
spends tens of millions of dollars each year addressing other sexual health
concerns. In other words, arguments articulated by the military that it would
be inappropriate or too costly to pay for sex-related healthcare services, seem
140

Id.
Id.
142 SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 18, at xi–xii (finding that “even at upper-bound estimates, less than
0.1 percent of the total force would seek transition-related care that could disrupt their ability to deploy”).
143 The discourse on the transgender ban does not really center on individual costs so much as gross
costs to the military. This is partially because the military is very opaque when it comes to individualized
costs for any form of medical treatment. The erectile dysfunction illustration serves to demonstrate the
military’s wealth and willingness to spend on the select health problems that it considers to be important.
144 Erectile Dysfunction, MAYO CLINIC (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/erectile-dysfunction/symptoms-causes/syc-20355776 [https://perma.cc/GX24-YGC6].
145 Id.
146 Id.
141
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disingenuous at best. In reality, the military is carving out a special
discriminatory exception: so long as those seeking the care are transgender,
no funds are available.
Our point is not to trivialize the conditions for which erectile
dysfunction medications are sought. Rather, it is to demonstrate that the
military does have the resources to spend money on sexual health.
Interestingly, the military spends over $84 million dollars each year to
address erectile dysfunction in its male service members.147 In fact, data from
the Defense Health Agency shows that the DoD spent $84.24 million on
erectile dysfunction medications in 2014, including $41.6 million for Viagra,
$22.82 million for Cialis, and $2.24 million for Revatio.148 These expenses
predated transgender individuals being able to openly enlist and were only
imposed shortly after the repeal of DADT. Further, from 2011 to 2014, the
DoD spent a total of $294 million on erectile dysfunction medications.149
If anything, the military’s new ban on transgender personnel likely
pushed some service members who are transgender to begin utilizing
services that they may not all have wanted or may not have wanted at the
time and as such may have actually added to the costs that the Trump
Administration purports to want to avoid.150 As Lieutenant Colonel Bree
Fram explained to a reporter, “It just didn’t feel great to have to do it on
someone else’s timeline other than my own.” 151 In some instances, the
Administration’s policy may have pushed military service members or their
families to make choices they simply were not ready for on an arbitrary
timeline. Lieutenant Colonel Fram’s wife put it this way: “It’s accelerated
everything so quickly . . . all of a sudden, we’re being forced to make this
choice that I don’t think we were quite at yet.”152
Likely, Lieutenant Colonel Fram and their family are not alone. The
policy effectively pushed all transgender service members to be diagnosed
with gender dysphoria, abandon military service, or hide their identity,
effectively forcing some military service members back into the closet by
147 Patricia Kime, DoD Spends $84M a Year on Viagra, Similar Meds, MILITARY TIMES
(Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.militarytimes.com/pay-benefits/military-benefits/health-care/2015/02/13/
dod-spends-84m-a-year-on-viagra-similar-meds [https://perma.cc/PL68-DBQ4]
148 Id.
149 Id. (“[S]ince 2011, the tab for drugs like Viagra, Cialis and Levitra totals $294 million—the
equivalent of nearly four U.S. Air Force F-35 Joint Strike Fighters.”).
150 The exact figures are difficult to know. Our point, however, is not about mass numbers. The
military need not discriminate against multitudes in order for their discrimination to be impermissible and
unconstitutional. Even if the military discriminates against only one individual based on sex, race, or
sexual status, that is impermissible, unconstitutional discrimination.
151 Hodges & Chang, supra note 26.
152 Id.
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muting their identities.153 Some military members have, for many years,
hidden the fact that they are transgender. Suddenly being forced out can be
unnecessarily disruptive. And the diagnosis of being “gender dysphoric”
may be unwelcome even for individuals comfortable and “out” with their
transgender identity.154
B. Military Readiness and Cohesion
The Trump Administration has articulated that military readiness, unit
cohesion, and health costs are important considerations in banning
transgender persons from the armed forces. However, the government’s ban
on transgender accession and service memberships is unjustified because
including transgender personnel in the military will likely have minimal
impact on readiness. In Section A, we addressed the government’s weak and
unsubstantiated claims that transgender personnel and potential service
members pose a risk to the military due to their mental health. Here, we
address the government’s other purported justifications.
According to research conducted by the RAND Corporation in 1993,
“[t]he main argument that military leaders use against lifting the ban” is that
it would “significantly disrupt unit cohesion.”155 However, the research team
“found no scientific evidence on the effects” purported by the military.156 A
critical review of available data resulted in a simple and valuable finding:
“[I]t is not necessary to like someone to work with him or her, so long as
members share a commitment to the group’s objectives. This conclusion was
also borne out in the review of racial integration.”157 That is, unit
153 Cf. Kenji Yoshino, The Pressure to Cover, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 15, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/15/magazine/the-pressure-to-cover.html
[https://perma.cc/9BVTGPXC] (explaining the pressure and psychological burdens to be closeted or “covering”).

When I began teaching at Yale Law School in 1998, a friend spoke to me frankly. “You’ll have a
better chance at tenure,” he said, “if you’re a homosexual professional than if you’re a professional
homosexual.” Out of the closet for six years at the time, I knew what he meant. To be a
“homosexual professional” was to be a professor of constitutional law who “happened” to be gay.
To be a “professional homosexual” was to be a gay professor who made gay rights his work.
Others echoed the sentiment in less elegant formulations.
Id.
154 The military policy also fails to account for individuals who are nonbinary with regard to gender
or do not identify with a particular gender.
155 RAND CORP., supra note 50; see also SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 18, at 44.
156 RAND CORP., supra note 50; see also SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 18, at 45.
157 RAND CORP., supra note 50 (“‘Cohesion’ is a term that is generally used in the military to refer
to the forces that bind individuals together as a group. It is helpful to think of it in two ways: (1) social
cohesion, which refers to the nature and quality of the emotional bonds of friendship, caring, and
closeness among group members; and (2) task cohesion, which refers to the shared commitment among
members to achieve a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group.”).
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performance is associated with task cohesion—not necessarily social
cohesion, which relates to individuals’ friendships and family relationships.
We find the Trump Administration’s claims that transgender service
members would undermine unit readiness, cohesion, and effectiveness to
contradict empirical evidence, including data from its own military, the
RAND Report, a study commissioned by the military, and other government
studies. For example, the 2016 RAND Report found “no evidence . . . that
allowing transgender personnel to serve openly has had any negative effect
on unit or overall cohesion.”158 This is not surprising considering government
studies and various reports following the 2010 repeal of DADT demonstrate
that the “armed forces also had valuable and highly skilled transgender
members.”159
The district court in Stockman v. Trump160 emphasized this point. In
refusing to grant the Trump Administration’s motion to lift its injunction, the
court noted that the government’s argument that transgender service
members would disrupt “unit cohesion” mirrored similarly specious claims
related to DADT and the government’s ban on gay and lesbian service
members openly serving in the armed forces.161 The court noted that contrary
to the military’s unsubstantiated claims that the enlistment of transgender
personnel would disrupt unit cohesion, “the military ha[s] repeatedly proven
its capacity to adapt and grow stronger specifically by the inclusion” of the
groups it previously sought to ban, including “blacks, women, and gays.” 162
In its reasoning, the court cited its earlier decision in Log Cabin
Republicans v. U.S., which found that the military’s DADT policy violated
the First Amendment.163 In striking the ban, the court noted that “‘the loss of
unit cohesion’ has been consistently weaponized against open service by a
new minority group” throughout history.164

158

See Brief in Opposition, supra note 3, at 5 n.2; SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 18.
See Brief in Opposition, supra note 3, at 3.
160 Stockman v. Trump, 331 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1003–04 (C.D. Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 1856539 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 2018). The Supreme Court stayed the district court order granting the
preliminary injunction pending the Trump Administration’s appeal in the Ninth Circuit. Trump v.
Stockman, 139 S. Ct. 950 (Jan. 22, 2019) (mem.).
161 Stockman, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 1003–04.
162 Id. at 1004.
163 Id. (“The court made this determination despite the government’s argument that DADT ‘is
necessary to protect unit cohesion and heterosexual service members’ privacy.’ In finding DADT ‘is not
necessary to protect the privacy of service [] members,’ the court relied upon testimony given by various
officers in the military who attested there was no nexus between DADT and a loss of unit cohesion.”
(citing Log Cabin Republicans v. U.S., 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 920–23 (C.D. Cal. 2010))).
164 Id. at 1004.
159
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Nor are transgender military personnel new to the military. They have
already served without causing or triggering a lack of cohesion within the
armed services. Former Army Secretary Eric Fanning stated that
“[p]articularly among commanders in the field, there was an increasing
awareness that there were already capable, experienced transgender service
members in every branch.”165 These observations are consistent with the
findings from the Working Group convened by Secretary of Defense Ashton
Carter in 2015 to examine military policy in relation to transgender service
members as well as the Directive-type Memorandum, “Military Service of
Transgender Service Members.”166
The Working Group conducted a comprehensive study of available and
relevant evidence to determine the impacts on transgender individuals
serving openly in the U.S. military.167 In the subsequent policy
implementation fact sheet, the DoD found, “open service by transgender
Service members, while being subject to the same standards and procedures
as other members with regard to their medical fitness for duty, physical
fitness, uniform and grooming, deployability, and retention, is consistent
with military readiness.”168
Secretary Carter urged that the “most important qualification for service
members should be whether they’re able and willing to do their job.”169
Subsequently, the DoD concluded that transgender personnel, subject to the
same “rigorous standards” as other military personnel, were fit for
readiness.170 In addition, the DoD found including transgender personnel to
serve would strengthen the military and not detract from it, because it would
strengthen military diversity.171
Finally, Secretary Carter acknowledged that the military’s policy
banning transgender members actually hurt the military’s interests. Among

165 Declaration of Eric K. Fanning in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 5,
Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 17-CV-01597), vacated sub nom, Doe 2 v.
Shanahan, 755 F. App’x 19 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
166 Carter, supra note 4.
167 Working Group to Study Implications of Transgender Service, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. NEWSROOM,
(July
13,
2015),
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/News/Article/Article/612640/
[https://perma.cc/2T2V-W5PL].
168 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., TRANSGENDER SERVICE MEMBER POLICY IMPLEMENTATION FACT SHEET 1
(2016), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2016/0616_policy/Transgender-Implementation-FactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/97U3-QLRT].
169 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Statement by Secretary of Defense Ash Carter on DOD
Transgender Policy (July 13, 2015), https://dod.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-ReleaseView/Article/612778 [https://perma.cc/B3VP-QQFQ].
170 Carter, supra note 166, at 2.
171 Id.
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the reasons he offered was that the military ban was distracting.172 A
distracted military is by definition less ready. In a press statement, he said
that it caused “uncertainty” in the military. This uncertainty and distraction
undermined the goals of the DoD because the policy was confusing and
“contrary” to the military’s “value of service and individual merit.”173
In fact, the Working Group’s research contributed to the policy adopted
by the Obama Administration to permit transgender service members to
serve openly. According to the DoD, the “policy was crafted through a
comprehensive and inclusive process that included the leadership of the
Armed Services, medical and personnel experts across the [DoD],
transgender Service members, outside medical experts, advocacy groups,
and the RAND Corporation.”174
C. Lessons from Abroad: Liberalizing U.S. Policy to Meet a Changing
World
During the Obama Administration, the Working Group established by
Secretary Carter, as well as research conducted by the RAND Corporation,
concluded that military readiness would not be undermined by permitting
transgender service members to serve openly. After extensive study and
research, including visiting other nations and their militaries, they concluded
that “close allies” have successfully incorporated transgender individuals
into their militaries.175
In other words, models already exist for permitting a more inclusive
military. In a press statement, Secretary Carter explained, “It’s worth noting
that at least 18 countries already allow transgender personnel to serve openly
in their militaries.”176 Secretary Carter explained that a rigorous review and
analysis of allied militaries further confirmed that “there would be ‘minimal
readiness impacts from allowing transgender service members to serve
openly.’”177
Researchers visited France, Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, Norway, and Israel. These nations have a broad spectrum
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., supra note 169.
Id.
174 See Transgender Policy, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://dod.defense.gov/News/SpecialReports/0616_
transgender-policy-archive [https://perma.cc/W66Q-ZDC7].
175 Ashton Carter, DoD Transgender Policy Changes: New Policy Will End Ban on Transgender
Americans in the United States Military, MEDIUM (June 30, 2016), https://medium.com/@SecDef/dodtransgender-policy-changes-4f473b21b416 [https://perma.cc/4ZAD-FNDT].
176 Id.
177 Id.
172
173
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of policies related to LGBTQ personnel in the military. Of the nations
visited, none maintained an absolute ban on LGBTQ personnel serving in
the military.178
Researchers found that “both research and the experience of foreign
militaries and domestic organizations,” including highly successful Fortune
500 companies, “suggest that a number of factors can minimize social
disruption.”179 They pointed out:
First, leaders play a key role in promoting and maintaining unit cohesion.
Second, military roles, regulations, and norms all enhance the likelihood
that heterosexuals will work cooperatively with homosexuals. Third,
external threats enhance cohesion, provided that the group members are
mutually threatened and there is the possibility that cooperative group
action can eliminate the danger.180
A review of foreign militaries that permit LGBTQ personnel to openly
serve indicates a minimum likely impact on unit cohesion and force
readiness. According to the RAND Corporation, based on its analysis of
foreign military policies, there will be “little or no impact on unit cohesion,
operational effectiveness, or readiness.”181 Rather, leaders in foreign
militaries noted that their LGBTQ policies for military service members “had
benefits for all service members by creating a more inclusive and diverse
force.”182
D. The Transgender Military Ban Violates the Constitutional Rights of
Transgender Individuals
The ban on transgender individuals serving in the military is
discrimination based on gender identity and serves no legitimate, let alone
important or compelling, interest. It thus violates the Constitution’s
requirement for equal protection of the laws. A number of factors support
enjoining the President’s ban on constitutional grounds. The unusual
circumstances that brought about the ban, commencing with tweets by
President Trump, reflect that it is based on animus and not any legitimate
policy justification.183
178 RAND CORP., supra note 50. The United Kingdom policy that once banned gays, lesbians, and
transgender persons, has been lifted.
179 Id.; Carter, supra note 175 (“Today, over a third of Fortune 500 companies—including companies
like Boeing, CVS, and Ford—offer employee health insurance plans with transgender-inclusive
coverage.”).
180 RAND CORP., supra note 50.
181 SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 18.
182 Id.
183 See generally Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2012).
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The policy is overbroad and far reaching, subjecting an entire class to
blatant, unwarranted, and unjustified discrimination by the military. As
discussed earlier, the ban lacks legitimate justification and has not been
supported by evidence to bolster the government’s claims that inclusion of
transgender personnel in the military will result in unreadiness, a lack of
cohesion, and ineffectiveness. Even if we assume, as the government claims,
that the policy is not derived from the President’s tweets, but instead from
an independent, deliberative process undertaken by former Secretary of
Defense James Mattis, we still find the policy flawed.184 That is, even if the
military’s new policy is not merely an implementation of the president’s
tweets or post hoc process, the substance of the policy remains
constitutionally unsound because there is no reason to believe that
transgender individuals serving in the military will harm its operation in any
way.
Ultimately, the government has a long and established history of
weaponizing its “cohesion in units” argument to serve as a trump card when
promoting unjustified discrimination within the armed forces.185 In this case,
the government claims that if it does not succeed in barring transgender
persons from serving in the military, this will “pose[] a threat to . . . sound
leadership.”186
We have seen exactly this playbook before with the government’s ban
on LGBTQ people in the military, the integration of African Americans in
the military, and the lifting of the ceiling on women’s service in the armed
forces. All of these factors give rise not only to justifying a permanent defeat
of the President’s transgender ban, but also help to explain why the district
courts issued preliminary injunctions.
In this Essay, we do not dispute the government’s arguments that
lethality, maximizing military effectiveness, and unit cohesion are

184 See Appellant's Opening Brief at 17, Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 1835347), 2018 WL 2981765 (“Rather than address the Department's 2018 policy on its own terms, the
district court brushed it aside as the mere implementation of the President's memorandum that it had
already enjoined. But even a cursory comparison of the President's policy and the one proposed by the
Secretary of Defense reveals that the two are markedly different in both process and substance. The
President ordered a return to a longstanding policy that generally disqualified individuals from service on
the basis of transgender status while the military further studied the issue. By contrast, the Department's
2018 policy, the product of a comprehensive review by high-ranking military officials exercising their
considered judgment, presumptively disqualifies only certain individuals on the basis of a medical
condition and its treatment.”); Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *6 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 13, 2018), vacated and remanded, 926 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2019) (“The Court finds that the
2018 Memorandum and the Implementation Plan do not substantively rescind or revoke the Ban [as
articulated by President Trump's tweets], but instead threaten the very same violations that caused it and
other courts to enjoin the Ban in the first place.”).
185 See supra notes 116, 157 and accompanying text.
186 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 14.
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reasonable goals. Neither did the plaintiffs in the litigation challenging the
ban. What we find wanting is the government’s ability to demonstrate that
banning transgender individuals from military service furthers those
interests. Based on our extensive review of the plaintiffs’ and defendant’s
briefs, RAND Report, DoD memoranda, the Mattis policy, and other related
reports and documents, the government’s claims cannot satisfy the burden of
demonstrating that its discrimination against transgender individuals
substantially relates to achieving its objectives.
In other words, we found no evidence that inclusion of transgender
service members in the armed forces will impair its cohesion, readiness, and
lethality. Further, we found no evidence that the military’s budget would be
substantially burdened by the inclusion of transgender individuals in the
armed forces. Perhaps most importantly, the government fails to provide
evidence to support the scope of its claims. In fact, the government’s claims
are so overbroad that they challenge reason and logic. The government tells
us transgender individuals, some whom were already serving in the military
for many years, will suddenly suffer such extreme mental health disorders
related to their transgender identity that will render them undeployable, make
the military unready, and interrupt the military’s cohesion. Is the U.S.
military, which boasts being the greatest in the world, truly so weakened by
the integration of a minority group? We think—and the evidence
demonstrates—it is not. Instead, we argue, the government’s claims are
fundamentally grounded in bias and stereotype.
Our conclusion is that the government has no proof that transgender
service members will disrupt core military objectives. At best, then, the
policy is based on hypotheticals and, at worse, on discriminatory animus—
the type that we have seen before from the military when it harassed and
banned gays as well as when it resisted integrating African Americans,
despite the fact that so many gave their lives to defend the United States
throughout its history.
Challenges to the military’s policy banning transgender personnel from
service in the armed forces culminated in four cases filed in district court, all
of which resulted in preliminary injunctions against the transgender ban:
Stone v. Trump187 in the District of Maryland, Doe 1 v. Trump188 in the District

187

Stone v. Trump, 356 F. Supp. 3d 505, 5188 (D. Md. 2018).
Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 217 (D.D.C. 2017), vacated sub nom, Doe 2 v. Shanahan,
755 F. App’x 19 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (granting in part the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction against
the transgender ban).
188
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of Columbia, Karnoski v. Trump189 in the Western District of Washington,
and Stockman v. Trump190 in the Central District of California.
The four cases are substantively quite similar. All were brought on
behalf of transgender persons either currently enlisted in or attempting to
join the military. All petitioners leveled equal protection and substantive due
process claims against the Trump Administration’s policy for the
“accession” (admittance policy), “retention” (discharge/separation policy),
and sex transition surgery provisions of the transgender ban. All four cases
succeeded on their initial motions for preliminary injunctions in 2017, when
the ban had only been articulated in tweets and a two-page presidential
memorandum191 lacking any expert testimony or evidentiary support. In a
highly unusual move, two of the stays, Karnoski and Stockman, were later
lifted by the Supreme Court.192 We briefly turn to those cases to emphasize
the ban’s constitutional impermissibility.
In both cases, the plaintiffs’ claims that the transgender ban fails to
serve any legitimate purpose, and violates their constitutional rights were
persuasive, especially to the district courts that issued the injunctions. The
courts do not, of course, question the importance of military readiness and
cohesion but conclude that there is no basis for believing that the transgender
military ban serves these goals in any way. For example, in Karnoski, the
plaintiffs alleged that the ban, “[d]ripping with animus,” violated substantive
due process and the Equal Protection Clause.193 The plaintiffs claimed that
“[t]he purpose and effect of the Ban and current accessions bar are to chill
constitutionally protected First Amendment activity.”194 They claimed that
the military’s policy, “on its face demonstrates that it is directed at
suppressing the gender expression and related expressive conduct of

189 Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2017 WL 6311305, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2017),
appeal dismissed, No. 17-36009, 2017 WL 8229552 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 2017) (granting plaintiffs’ motion
for preliminary injunction against the transgender ban).
190 Stockman v. Trump, No. EDCV 17-1799 JGB (KKx), 2017 WL 9732572, at *166 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 22, 2017) (granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction against the transgender ban).
191 Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, supra note 104.
192 Trump v. Karnoski, 139 S. Ct. 950 (2019) (mem.); Trump v. Stockman, 139 S. Ct. 950 (2019)
(mem.).
193 Complaint at 3, Karnoski v. Trump, 328 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (No. C17-1297MJP), 2017 WL 3730600 (“Dripping with animus, the Ban and the current accessions bar violate the
equal protection and due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment and the free speech guarantee of the
First Amendment. They are unsupported by any compelling, important, or even rational justification.”).
194 Id. at 27.
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transgender individuals.”195 The court agreed that the policy impermissibly
burdened the speech of the plaintiffs.196
In determining the likelihood of success on the equal protection claim,
the Karnoski court applied a similar reasoning to the District Court of
Maryland in Stone, concluding that transgender status constituted a “quasisuspect classification”197 akin to what might be called the traditional gender
discrimination canon of cases such as United States v. Virginia, and was
accordingly entitled to intermediate scrutiny.198 Relying on Obergefell v.
Hodges,199 the district court determined that, first, plaintiffs were likely to
succeed on the merits of their substantive due process claim and, second,
transgender status constituted a quasi-suspect classification. The court found
a fundamental right to express one’s gender identity,200 and in a later
proceeding wrote:
Today, the Court concludes that transgender people constitute a suspect
class. Transgender people have long been forced to live in silence, or to
come out and face the threat of overwhelming discrimination. Therefore,
the Court GRANTS summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ and Washington’s
favor as to the applicable level of scrutiny. The Ban specifically targets

195

Id.
Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2017 WL 6311305, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2017),
appeal dismissed, No. 17-36009, 2017 WL 8229552 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 2017) (“The policy penalizes
transgender service members—but not others—for disclosing their gender identity, and is therefore a
content-based restriction. Even giving the government the benefit of a more deferential standard of review
under [Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 355 (1980)], the policy does not survive. As discussed in the
context of Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge, . . . Defendants have not demonstrated that the intrusion
upon protected expression furthers an important government interest.”).
197 Id. at *7. The Supreme Court, of course, has articulated three levels of scrutiny: strict scrutiny,
intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152–53 n.4 (1938) (first drawing a distinction between categories with a presumption of constitutionality
and those “subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny”); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976) (finding gender-based classifications subject to intermediate scrutiny). The Court, though, in its
recent cases on marriage equality did not specify the level of scrutiny to be used for sexual orientation
discrimination. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
198 Karnoski, 2017 WL 6311305, at *7; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
199 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589 (“The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and
autonomy, including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs.”).
200 Karnoski, 2017 WL 6311305, at *8 (“The policy directly interferes with Plaintiffs’ ability to
define and express their gender identity, and penalizes Plaintiffs for exercising their fundamental right to
do so openly by depriving them of employment and career opportunities.”).
196
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one of the most vulnerable groups in our society, and must satisfy strict
scrutiny if it is to survive.201
Finally, the court found that the policy lacked sufficient evidence to be
entitled to the deference normally afforded military policymaking under
Rotsker v. Goldberg, where the underlying policy in question was enacted
after extensive review.202 In the instant case, the court found, “the prohibition
on military service by transgender individuals was announced by President
Trump on Twitter, abruptly and without any evidence of considered reason
or deliberation.”203 Therefore, the court concluded the policy was not entitled
to Rostker deference.204
Likewise, in Stockman,205 the plaintiffs, three prospective enlistees,206
four transgender service members,207 and an organizational client,208 alleged
that the transgender military ban violated their equal protection, First
Amendment, and substantive due process rights.209 The district court granted
the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction based on the likelihood of
success on the merits of the equal protection claim.210
Then, in 2018, following the filing of the Mattis policy, the Trump
Administration moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction, arguing that
201 Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018),
vacated and remanded, 926 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2019); see also id. at *9 (“At the preliminary injunction
stage, the Court found that transgender people were, at minimum, a quasi-suspect class.”).
202 Karnoski, 2017 WL 6311305, at *8 (“In Rostker the Supreme Court considered whether the
Military Selective Service Act (‘MSSA’), which compelled draft registration for men only, was
unconstitutional. Finding that the MSSA was enacted after extensive review of legislative testimony, floor
debates, and committee reports, the Supreme Court held that Congress was entitled to deference when, in
‘exercising the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules for their governance,’
it does not act [without] reason.” (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 59, 71–72 (1981))).
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Stockman v. Trump, No. EDCV 17-1799 JGB, 2017 WL 9732572 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017).
206 Aiden Stockman, intending to join the Air Force, Nicholas Talbott, intending to join the Air Force
National Guard, and Tamasyn Reeves, intending to serve in the Navy. Id. at *4–5.
207 John Doe 1, serving in the Air Force, John Doe 2, serving in the Army, Jane Doe 2, serving in the
Air Force, and, most notably, Jaquice Tate, a distinguished Sergeant in the Army. See id. at *5–6 (“[Tate]
enlisted in 2008 and has served domestically, in Germany, and on deployment in Iraq. For his service in
Iraq, he was awarded an Army Commendation Medal. He has also received multiple Army Achievement
Medals, Certificates of Appreciation, and two Colonel Coins of Excellence.” (citations omitted)).
208 The LGBTQ civil rights advocacy organization Equality California. Id. at *6.
209 Id. at *1.
210 Id. at *15 (“[A]ll the evidence in the record suggests the ban’s cost savings to the government is
miniscule. Furthermore, Defendants’ unsupported allegation that allowing transgender individuals to be
in the military would adversely affect unit cohesion is similarly unsupported by the proffered evidence.
These justifications fall far short of exceedingly persuasive. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs have
demonstrated their Equal Protection claim will likely succeed on the merits and further analysis of their
other claims is unnecessary at this stage of the proceedings.” (citations omitted)).
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the district court’s reasoning for granting the injunction in 2017 no longer
stood.211 Essentially, the government claimed that the rationale for the policy
was no longer based on three tweets from the president, but rather a more
engaged study of the military’s interests in maintaining a ready, cohesive,
and effective military. The government claimed that the Mattis policy
memorialized a more robust study of the inherent risks of transgender
persons serving in the armed forces, thus obviating the earlier rationale for
issuing the preliminary injunction:
Last December, this Court entered a preliminary injunction forbidding
the enforcement of several directives in a Presidential Memorandum
from August 2017 concerning military service by transgender
individuals. The Court understood these directives to institute a policy
“categorically excluding transgender individuals” based on reasons that
“were not supported and were in fact contradicted by the only military
judgment available at the time.” . . . The bases for that preliminary
injunction no longer exist.212
The district court was not persuaded.213 We also find the government’s
claims lacking merit and constitutionally flawed. The court rightfully
concluded that the enactment of the newer policy, based on the Mattis policy,
does not render moot a prior challenge where the new law is substantially
similar to the first. The first policy banned transgender individuals based on
the government’s claims that gender dysphoria should disqualify individuals
from serving in the armed services. These claims were rooted in highly
speculative presumptions without a showing of any evidence. The Mattis
policy simply repeated these claims and was so fundamentally similar that
the court denied the government’s motion.214
Simply put, every district court to consider this issue concluded that the
government’s claims lack persuasion and the policy to ban transgender
individuals from serving in the military is unjustified by any legitimate
purpose, and thus, is unconstitutional. We agree with the district courts’
findings that the government could not bar “an otherwise qualified class of

211 Defendants’ Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction at 1, Stockman v. Trump, 331 F.
Supp. 3d 990 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 5:17-CV-01799-JGB-KK) (citations omitted); see also id. at 2 (“To
the extent that Plaintiffs may seek to challenge that new policy, that independent controversy should not
be litigated under the shadow of a preliminary injunction of a Presidential Memorandum that is no longer
in effect.”).
212 Id. (citations omitted).
213 Stockman, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 998.
214 Id. at 999, 1004 (“Defendants contend this policy has exceptions which will allow some
transgender individuals to serve in the military, yet these very exceptions expose the policy as being
substantially the same as the first.” (citation omitted)).
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discrete and insular minorities from joining the armed forces.”215 The
President’s tweets were exceedingly unpersuasive as were the subsequent
military reports, which merely repeated similar assertions levied against
other minority groups, including African Americans who sought fuller
integration in the military during Jim Crow.216
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S LIFTING OF THE INJUNCTIONS ON THE
DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS WAS UNJUSTIFIED
The Trump Administration, eager to enforce its transgender ban,
appealed the district court injunctions in related cases in California and
Washington to the Supreme Court, despite the fact that the cases were
already appealed to and under review in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
and review in the other Circuits was underway.217 This was, at bottom, the
government’s blatant attempt to circumvent the appellate review process in
order to implement the Administration’s ban. In seeking this extraordinary
diversion of process, the government further expressed the odious intent of
its ban.
In this Part, we briefly describe why the Court’s intervention was
premature and procedurally flawed. The government sought extraordinary
review based on what it articulated was a matter of grave urgency for the
military, because “the authority of the U.S. military to determine who may
serve in the Nation’s armed forces” was at stake.218 Yet, the facts that the
military pointed to showed no greater urgency than prior military matters
settled through the ordinary judicial process.219

215

Id. at 1004.
See id.
217 Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2019) (“In light of the Supreme Court’s
January 22, 2019 stay of the district court’s preliminary injunction, we stay the preliminary injunction
through the district court’s further consideration of Defendants’ motion to dissolve the injunction.”).
218 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 16, Trump v. Karnoski, 139 S. Ct. 950 (2019)
(No. 18-676).
219 See Brief in Opposition, supra note 3, at 18–19 (“[E]xtensive record evidence shows that
transgender men and women have been serving honorably and effectively, including on active duty in
combat zones. For example, during congressional hearings in April 2018, the heads of three service
branches testified that they were unaware of any evidence that service by transgender people impairs
military effectiveness, and that transgender individuals are able to meet service standards and serve
without issue. The very policy that petitioners want to implement—the Mattis Plan—would itself allow
hundreds of transgender individuals to continue serving in the armed forces through a grandfather
provision—an exception that cannot be squared with the government’s claims of urgency to eliminate all
other transgender personnel.” (citations omitted)).
216
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A. A Problem of Process
It is unusual for the Supreme Court to lift preliminary injunctions issued
by a district court.220 In its briefs to the Court appealing the injunctions, the
government claimed that the district courts’ reasons for granting the
injunctions “are wrong” and “warrant [the Supreme Court’s] immediate
review.”221 The government urged the Court to engage in an unusual practice
and grant the petitions for writs of certiorari before judgement. The
government emphasized that without the Court’s “prompt” intervention, the
military would not be able to implement its policy.222
The Trump Administration asked the Supreme Court to take the cases
before they reached review in the United States Courts of Appeals.223 The
government claimed immediate relief was necessary because the district
court entered a nationwide preliminary injunction blocking President
Trump’s implementation of the policy banning transgender persons from
serving in the military. In its brief to the Court, the government claimed that
this policy, “in Secretary Mattis’s professional judgment, ‘will place the
Department of Defense in the strongest position to protect the American
people, to fight and win America’s wars, and to ensure the survival and
success of our Service members around the world.’”224
On January 22, 2019, the Court granted stays on the preliminary
injunctions in Trump v. Karnoski and Trump v. Stockman. The injunction in
Doe 2 v. Shanahan was dissolved by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals later
in 2019. By staying the preliminary injunctions, the ban on military service
by transgender individuals could go into effect immediately while the cases
are being heard in the United States courts of appeals.225 The Supreme
Court’s conservative majority provided neither guidance nor explanation
when it lifted the district courts’ stays in a 5–4 decision, which allowed
President Trump’s ban on military service by transgender individuals to go

220 See, e.g., Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S. 1328, 1330 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983) (in
chambers) (“[A] stay application to a Circuit Justice on a matter before a court of appeals is rarely
granted.” (quoting Atiyeh v. Capps, 499 U.S. 1312, 1313 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1981) (in
chambers)).
221 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 12, Trump v. Stockman, 139 S. Ct. 950 (2019)
(No. 18-678).
222 Id. at 11.
223 Id. at 12.
224 Id. at 12–13 (citations omitted).
225 Trump v. Karnoski, 139 S. Ct. 950, 950 (2019) (mem.); Trump v. Stockman, 139 S. Ct. 950, 950
(2019) (mem.).
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into immediate effect. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan
voted to deny the government’s application.226
Even while the Court declined to take the cases on writ of certiorari, its
lifting of the injunctions was nonetheless extraordinary. In a line of cases
(military and non-related to military) dating back decades, especially those
involving important matters of constitutionality, the Court consistently
expressed the preference and benefit of review by courts of appeals.227 For
instance, in United States v. Mendoza, the Court articulated that it benefits
from allowing circuit courts to consider a question before its review.228 The
Court has consistently recognized the “wisdom of allowing difficult issues
to mature through full consideration by the courts of appeals” prior to its
review.229 There is no reason why the review of the Trump transgender
military ban should have been treated any differently.
B. The Government’s Urgency to Implement a Discriminatory Policy Did
Not Justify Extraordinary Supreme Court Review
We contend that the government’s claims did not arise to the level of
paramount importance such to circumvent appellate review and justify the
Court’s extraordinary intervention of imposing stays of the injunctions.
Moreover, nothing in the Mattis policy, President Trump’s tweets, or any
other government brief or memorandum suggests the ban credibly articulated
a pressing need for the Court’s intervention.
The government claimed that lifting the preliminary injunctions
deserved immediate action from the Supreme Court because the district
courts’ injunctions interfered with the “adoption of [the Mattis] policy that
the military, in its best professional judgement, has determined is
necessary.”230 The government asserted that a failure to immediately
implement the policy placed the military in grave danger and “posed too
great a risk to military effectiveness and lethality.”231

226 Trump v. Karnoski, 139 S. Ct. 950, 950 (2019) (mem.); see Trump v. Stockman, 139 S. Ct. 950,
950 (2019) (mem.).
227 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 543 U.S. 1096 (2005)
(denying petition for certiorari before judgment); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
228 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984).
229 Brief in Opposition, supra note 3, at 18 (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S.
112, 135 n.26 (1977)).
230 Government’s Mot. to Expedite Briefing Schedule at 3, Doe 2 v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 474
(D.D.C. Sept. 10, 2018) (No. 18-5257).
231 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 12.
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The Trump Administration expressed hardship at being “forced to
maintain that prior policy for nearly a year.”232 It further claimed that without
the Court’s “prompt intervention,” the military’s discriminatory policy was
unlikely to be implemented “any time soon.”233 Although its claims appeared
neither extraordinary nor time-sensitive, especially given the constitutional
questions at stake, the government appealed to the Court rather than abide
by traditional appellate judicial process. We find several problems here with
the government’s claims.
First, as we have explained here and as is copiously documented
elsewhere, including the RAND Report, the Carter Working Group Report,
and in the district courts’ opinions, there is no current harm to the military in
permitting transgender personnel to serve. Indeed, the government cannot
prove past harm given that transgender personnel have been permitted to
openly serve since the issuance of the Carter Policy and have secretly served
for much longer.
Second, the government claimed the Supreme Court’s intervention—
either by granting certiorari or by staying the preliminary injunctions—was
urgent. However, the government’s own litigation strategy belies and
contradicts its claims.234 Originally, the “government voluntarily withdrew
its first appeal of the preliminary injunction and did not seek a stay or
review” from the Supreme Court.235 At no prior stage in this litigation had
the government found its interests of such urgency as to seek a stay. In fact,
at one point in the underlying litigation, the government waited three months
before seeking a stay of the injunction from the district court.236 In light of
the government’s litigation choices and the procedural history of the case,
the government lacked credibility in its new claim that banning transgender
individuals from the military is of “such imperative public importance as to
justify th[e] Court’s immediate review.”237
Third, the government has emphasized that its current policy (the Mattis
policy) is not a rubber stamp of the President’s first policy articulated
through tweets. The government has stressed that its current policy is the
result of serious deliberation and study across the military and inclusive of
transgender personnel.238 It is highly relevant then that the government, after
such extensive deliberation, still cannot show that the national interest is
harmed. The government has not provided evidence that the military has
232
233
234
235
236
237
238

Id.
Id.
Brief in Opposition, supra note 3, at 19–20.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Id.
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suffered or is currently suffering by permitting transgender individuals to
serve in its ranks. Earlier, we scrutinized the government’s troubling and
unsubstantiated claims related to cohesion and readiness, exactly the same
arguments that have been used to exclude Black, gay, lesbian, and bisexual
individuals from the military in the past.
It is difficult to reconcile the government’s convoluted argumentation
that: (a) transgender persons must be banned from the armed forces because
they pose various threats to a safe and secure military, while (b) transgender
personnel currently serving may be grandfathered in and continue to serve.
The claims for urgent Supreme Court intervention were speculative at best.
In this regard, the Supreme Court ignored the extensive record of
evidence that disproved the government’s claims. Not only was there no
urgent harm to national interests or military interests such as to justify the
Court staying the injunctions, but the government was actually benefiting
from the military service of transgender personnel. Transgender individuals
were already serving “honorably and effectively, including on active duty in
combat zones.”239 As pointed out in the opposition brief, “[D]uring
congressional hearings in April 2018, the heads of three service branches
testified that they were unaware of any evidence that service by transgender
people impairs military effectiveness, and that transgender individuals are
able to meet service standards and serve without issue.”240
Finally, there was no need for the Court’s expedited intervention
because the district courts and the courts of appeals were already proceeding
expeditiously and with “due regard for the need to develop a complete record
to facilitate judicial review.”241 Discovery continued at the district court and
the circuit court of appeals was already considering the government’s appeal
on an expedited basis.
At the very least, it is difficult to see how the Court’s majority could
conclude that the preliminary injunctions issued by the district courts should
be stayed. A highly deferential standard must be met for the Court to stay a
preliminary injunction issued by a trial court,242 and in the case at hand the
Supreme Court did not reach that high standard.

239

See id. at 19.
Id.
241 Id.
242 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (articulating the stay standard)
(citing Lucas v. Townsend, 486 U.S. 1301, 1304 (Kennedy, Circuit Justice 1988) (in chambers); Rostker
v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (Brennan, Circuit Justice 1980) (in chambers)).
240
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IV. THE COURT’S LIFTING OF THE INJUNCTIONS LIKELY REFLECTS A
MAJOR SHIFT ON THE COURT AS TO LGBTQ ISSUES WITHOUT JUSTICE
KENNEDY
The government’s ban on transgender individuals serving in the
military underscores additional civil rights and civil liberties concerns
related to LGBTQ equality, which we briefly address here. The Trump
Administration’s efforts to bar transgender military service align with its
other efforts to formally retrench the rights and equality of transgender men
and women. It fits a broader pattern of government-led efforts to undo civil
rights safeguards that protect LGBTQ individuals. These efforts extend
beyond the military to include other basic human dignities, including health
care,243 the ability to travel,244 and more. This is what makes the Supreme
Court’s stay of the district court injunctions all the more problematic and
disconcerting.
During President Trump’s first two years in office: his first Attorney
General reversed federal policy protecting transgender workers from
discrimination under Title VII;245 the Administration unexpectedly
intervened in a major federal lawsuit to stress that the Civil Rights Act of
1964 does not apply to gay workers—and therefore does not protect them
from discrimination;246 the Bureau of Prisons repealed rules “that had
243 See Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, 84 Fed. Reg.
27846, 27871 (June 14, 2019) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 438, 440, 460, 45 C.F.R. pts. 86, 92, 147,
155–56) (“[T]he current regulation does not treat ‘an individual’s sexual orientation status alone [a]s a
form of sex discrimination under Section 1557.’ It is the position of the United States government that
Title VII . . . ‘does not reach discrimination based on sexual orientation.’” (citations omitted)).
244 Edward Wong & Michael Schwirtz, U.S. Bans Diplomatic Visas for Foreign Same-Sex Domestic
Partners, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/02/us/politics/visa-ban-samesex-partners-diplomats.html [https://perma.cc/JSX5-6VFU] (“United Nations employees were notified in
a memo last month that only married same-sex partners seeking to accompany newly arrived officials to
the United States would be eligible for a G-4 visa.”).
245 Dominic Holden, Jeff Sessions Just Reversed a Policy that Protects Transgender Workers from
Discrimination, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 5, 2017, 10:00 AM, updated 11:14 AM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/dominicholden/jeff-sessions-just-reversed-a-policy-that-protects
[https://perma.cc/4KBT-7E53] (noting that according to Sessions, “Title VII’s prohibition on sex
discrimination encompasses discrimination between men and women but does not encompass
discrimination based on gender identity per se, including transgender status”); see also Brief for
Respondent, supra note 6 (brief in which the Administration advocates turning their policy position into
law, codifying this narrowing interpretation of Title VII).
246 This action was particularly unusual as the government was not a party to the litigation. The
government’s brief stated, “The sole question here is whether, as a matter of law, Title VII reaches sexual
orientation discrimination. It does not, as has been settled for decades. Any efforts to amend Title VII’s
scope should be directed to Congress rather than the courts.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Affirmance in No. 17-1618 and Reversal in No. 17-1623 at 2, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.,
883 F.3d 100 (2017) (No. 15-3775); see also Dean Spade & Craig Willse, Sex, Gender, and War in an
Age of Multicultural Imperialism, 1 QED: A JOURNAL IN GLBTQ WORLDMAKING 5 (2014).
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allowed transgender inmates to use facilities, including cellblocks and
bathrooms, that match their gender identity;”247 the Department of Education
refused to implement protections for transgender students and withdrew
Obama-era guidance that extended Title IX protection to transgender
discrimination;248 the Administration instituted a military ban, barring
transgender individuals from serving openly; and the Administration denied
visas to same-sex partners of diplomats, among other expressions of hostility
toward LGBTQ rights.249
Given this, we conclude this Essay with a prediction. The Supreme
Court’s lift of the district court injunctions blocking the implementation of a
Trump Administration policy to effectively ban transgender military
members from joining the United States military does not bode well for
LGBTQ rights. Our concern is not rooted in anecdote, but close observation
of the Trump Administration’s actions. In this Part, we briefly discuss what
the Court’s actions related to the military ban might foretell.
In one example, the Department of Health and Human Services has
proposed regulations that will replace an Obama-era rule expanding the
definition of sex discrimination to include gender identity. The revision of
the “on the basis of sex” definition to include harms inflicted against
transgender persons was hailed by advocacy groups as a profound human
and civil rights advancement.250 However, the Trump Administration,
247 Dominic Holden, We Made a List of All the Anti-LGBT Stuff Trump Has Done As President,
BUZZFEED
NEWS
(June
30,
2018,
10:08
AM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com
/article/dominicholden/trump-lgbt-anti-actions-administration-pridemonthhttps://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/dominicholden/trump-lgbt-anti-actions-administrationpride-month [https://perma.cc/B9LZ-J5F8]; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
CHANGE
NOTICE:
TRANSGENDER
OFFENDER
MANUAL
(2018),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4459297-BOP-Change-Order-Transgender-OffenderManual-5.html [https://perma.cc/M759-RHMS] (“The designation to a facility of the inmate’s identified
gender would be appropriate only in rare cases . . . .”).
248 Letter from Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. Scott S.
Harris, Clerk, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Feb. 22, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/3473548/GG-DOJ-16-273.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3HU-VASK]) (“This letter is to inform the
Court that, on February 22, 2017, the Department of Education, in conjunction with the Department of
Justice’s Office for Civil Rights, announced their decision to withdraw that guidance and a subsequent
joint guidance letter, not to rely on the views expressed in the guidance . . . .”).
249 Colum Lynch, Trump Administration to Deny Visas to Same-Sex Partners of Diplomats, U.N.
Officials, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 1, 2018, 6:36 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/01/trumpadministration-to-deny-visas-to-same-sex-partners-of-diplomats-un-officials-gay-lgbt
[https://perma.cc/L2PR-VCV9].
250 Emanuella Grinberg, Feds Issue Guidance on Transgender Access to School Bathrooms, CNN
(May 14, 2016, 3:48 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/05/12/politics/transgender-bathrooms-obamaadministration/index.html [https://perma.cc/A4EA-UK68] (“‘These groundbreaking guidelines not only
underscore the Obama administration’s position that discriminating against transgender students is flatout against the law, but they provide public school districts with needed and specific guidance
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through its Department of Health and Human Services, has proposed a new
policy, Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or
Activities, which would roll back the extension of “on the basis of sex” to
exclude discrimination against transgender individuals.251
Furthermore, the Trump Administration is transparent in its
discriminatory intent. As the Administration states in its supplement to the
proposed rule change, it finds the rule to be “overbroad” in its inclusion of
transgender persons.252 The Trump Administration expressed concern that
the policy would not permit discrimination against transgender persons.253
That is, a change in the Obama-era policy would permit health care workers
to “object to performing procedures like gender reassignment surgery.” 254 If
the Trump rule goes into effect, insurers would no longer be required to cover
all services for their transgender customers.255
This new rule and others respond to calls from religious communities
to reshape federal policies that seek to grant civil rights and civil liberties
protections to LGBTQ persons.256 The Trump Administration has responded
with great deference to these groups and, as such, has advanced policies that
negatively impact LGBTQ persons across a broad spectrum of fundamental
life activities including health, employment, housing, and education.257
In the health context, the Obama Administration sought to prohibit
discrimination in health care delivery and thereby extend civil rights
protections through the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which “prohibits
guaranteeing that transgender students should be using facilities consistent with their gender identity,’
said Human Rights Campaign President Chad Griffin.”).
251 Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, 84 Fed. Reg. 27846
(June 14, 2019) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 438, 440, 460; 45 C.F.R. pts. 86, 92, 147, 155, 156).
252 Proposed Rule, Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities,
Department of Health and Human Services, at 16, https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/1557-nprmhhs.pdf [https://perma.cc/39AC-47GP]; see also Executive Order on the Establishment of a White House
Faith and Opportunity Initiative May 3, 2018 (amending Executive Order 13279, Equal Protection of the
Laws for Faith-Based and Community Organizations)
253 Goodnough et al., supra note 6; see Proposed Rule, Nondiscrimination in Health and Health
Education Programs or Activities, supra note 252, at 16.
254 Goodnough et al. supra note 6.
255 Id.
256 See Gregory Korte, Trump Signs Executive Order Giving More Freedom to Federally Funded
Religious
Groups,
USA
TODAY
(May
3
2018,
2:36
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/05/03/faith-based-initiatives-trump-signs-ordernational-day-prayer/577171002/ [https://perma.cc/8REG-LZN8] (quoting Rachel Laser, CEO of
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, as saying “[t]he whole Trump-Pence line of
activity around this issue is enabling fundamentalists to impose their religion on the rest of us.”); Julie
Moreau, Anti-LGBTQ Adoption Bills ‘Snowballing’ in State Legislatures, Rights Group Says, NBC NEWS
(Apr. 4, 2019, 5:31 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/anti-lgbtq-adoption-billssnowballing-state-legislatures-rights-group-says-n991156 [https://perma.cc/M494-QP26]..
257 Goodnough et al., supra note 6.

801

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex, age or disability.”258
The ACA also prohibits discrimination in “any health program or activity”
that receives federal financial assistance. By including gender identity as a
feature of sex and extending protections to transgender individuals, the
Obama Administration afforded important civil rights protections to a
community that had previously been the subject of stereotype, scorn, and
discrimination.
We do not address here the subsequent litigation filed by religious
medical providers and groups challenging the expanded definition and
implementation of the new rule.259 Our point is simply this: by seeking to roll
back protections afforded transgender children, teens, and adults during the
Obama Administration, President Trump has confirmed his belief that
transgender persons deserve fewer rights than others.
In the employment context, the Trump Administration has challenged
the meaning of sex in relation to workplace discrimination. The Trump
Administration argues that Title VII does not bar discrimination against gays
and transgender persons in the workplace.260 And, given the vestiges of
homophobia and transphobia that remain in our society, the President is not
alone. The Supreme Court will consider whether Title VII bars workplace
discrimination against LGBTQ persons in the coming year.261
The Administration’s expanded “conscience rule,” although more
widely debated in light of its serious implications for reproductive health and
rights, also seriously implicates LGBTQ rights.262 This expanded
“conscience rule” not only permits health care workers to deny people
258

Id.
See, e.g., Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Azar, No. 16-cv-000108-O, 2019 WL 5157100, at *9 (N.D.
Tex., Oct. 15, 2019) (holding that Christian health care professionals may refuse to perform transgenderrelated care contrary to their religious beliefs).
260 Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, 84 Fed. Reg. 27846,
27871 (June 14, 2019) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 438, 440, 460; 45 C.F.R. pts. 86, 92, 147, 155,
156) (“[T]he current regulation does not treat ‘an individual’s sexual orientation status alone [a]s a form
of sex discrimination under Section 1557.’ It is the position of the United States government that Title
VII . . . ‘does not reach discrimination based on sexual orientation.’ . . . It is also the position of the United
States government that ‘Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination . . . does not encompass
discrimination based on gender identity per se, including transgender status.’” (citations omitted)).
261 Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert granted, 139 S. Ct.
1599 (2019) (mem.). Compare id. with Bostock v. Clayton Co., Ga, 723 Fed. A’ppx 964 (11th Cir. 2018).
262 Michele Goodwin & Allison Whelan, Constitutional Exceptionalism, 2016 U. ILL L. REV. 1287,
1312 (2016) (explaining “[m]any conscience laws permit and protect a health care provider’s or
institution’s refusal to provide or participate in reproductive health care services such as abortion and
sterilization. Montana’s law, for example, permits all persons to refuse to participate in a sterilization
based on moral convictions. Separate federal laws and regulations, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, prohibit employers from discriminating against current or potential employees ‘based on
religion, including religiously based objections to performing specific job functions.’”)
259
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reproductive services, including abortions and sterilizations, but would also
deny other services that might be sought by transgender individuals on the
basis of protecting health care providers’ religious and moral interests.263
This rule, along with the others that are religiously based that involve
reproductive health care, are particularly problematic as they use religion as
the basis for justifying harm to others. In other words, today conscience
clauses serve to shield from punishment what would otherwise be considered
unconstitutionally impermissible behavior. Elsewhere we write about the
problems associated with this type of rulemaking.264 Simply put, religion is
not and certainly should not serve as a justification for harming and
burdening the civil rights and civil liberties of others. However, the Trump
Administration has weaponized religion for just this reason. Even more, his
Administration has expanded what were already problematic grounds for
infringing the constitutional rights of others—religion—to something far
vaguer—moral rights.
The Trump Administration, through the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, has also issued a proposal that would permit homeless
shelters to segregate transgender people according to their biological sex.
This would also include requiring them to use bathrooms and sleep in
accommodations that correspond with their biological sex from birth.265
In the health context, the Trump Administration’s proposed policies
would “allow and even encourage providers who are biased against
transgender people to deny them treatment.”266 The new rules resituate civil
rights protections altogether by taking protections away from patients who
experience discriminatory treatment and by protecting the individuals who
discriminate against them, described as “clinicians who have objections to
treating them, or insurers who do not want to pay for their care.”267
We find all these proposals to be hostile to the constitutional rights of
transgender individuals, singling them out for unequal treatment, denying
them protections from discrimination, and more. Moreover, we predict the
attacks on transgender persons will not be isolated to these examples.
Because the Trump Administration’s policies in this regard are rooted in
stereotypes and stigmas related to sex, it is very likely that the
Administration’s efforts to undo civil rights will begin to chip away at
protections for gay, lesbian, and bisexual people.
263 Protecting Statutory Conscience Rights in Health Care; Delegations of Authority, 84 Fed. Reg.
23170 (May 21, 2018) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88).
264 Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Religion Is Not a Basis for Harming Others, 104 GEO.
L.J. 1111, 1134 (2016).
265 Goodnough et al., supra note 6.
266 Id.
267 Id.
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In this Essay, we have demonstrated how the Court took an
extraordinary measure in staying the lower courts’ preliminary injunctions.
Our concern looking forward is that the constitutional gains related to sex
and LGBTQ equality, particularly as evidenced through Supreme Court
victories, may very well obscure the Supreme Court’s preservation of
discrimination through transformation. While on one hand, the Court has
rejected anti-LGBTQ discrimination in the form of marriage equality,
policies and challenges brought forth by the Trump administration will test
the Court’s longer-term commitments to full equality.
Indeed, while LGBTQ advocates heralded the Supreme Court’s rulings
in United States v. Windsor268 and Obergefell v. Hodges269 as throwing off
the vestiges and badges of homophobia, discrimination against those
attracted to the same gender, and stereotyping of sexual minorities, we
caution that their celebration may have been premature. The majority
opinion in every Supreme Court decision in U.S. history expanding rights
for gay, lesbian, and bisexual people was written by Justice Kennedy: Romer
v. Evans;270 Lawrence v. Texas;271 United States v. Windsor;272 Obergefell v.
Hodges.273 Without Justice Kennedy it is hard to count five votes for the
future of LGBTQ rights.
This transformation of LGBTQ discrimination, we envisage, will
manifest despite lofty predictions that Chief Justice John Roberts might now
be a “swing vote.” Sadly, predictions otherwise are more illusory than real,
as evidenced by Justice Roberts’s dissents in Windsor274 and Obergefell.275
Indeed, in Obergefell—which declared unconstitutional state laws
prohibiting same-sex marriage—Roberts wrote a vehement dissent.276
Notably, it is the only dissent Roberts has read from the bench since coming
on to the Court in 2005.277
268

United States v. Windsor, 135 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
270 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
271 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003)
272 Windsor, 135 S. Ct. at 2682.
273 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.
274 Windsor, 135 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
275 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
276 See id. at 2612 (“The majority’s decision is an act of will, not legal judgment. The right [to
marriage] has no basis in the Constitution or this Court’s precedent . . . . It can be tempting for judges to
confuse our own preferences with the requirements of the law.”).
277 Ariane de Vogue, Roberts Issues Stern Dissent in Same-Sex Marriage Case, CNN (June 26, 2015,
5:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/26/politics/john-roberts-gay-marriage-dissent/index.html
[https://perma.cc/2VUB-RWYH] (“In [issuing his Obergefell dissent], Roberts did something he has
never done before: He read parts of his dissent from the bench. It is a move the justices save only for
cases they really care about, and in his 10 years on the bench, no other case prompted Roberts to take
such a step.”).
269
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Justices Thomas and Alito never once have voted in favor of LGBTQ
rights. Those who favor such protections hope that Justice Gorsuch or Justice
Kavanaugh will side with the more liberal Justices on these issues. That is
what makes so disturbing their joining with Justices Roberts, Thomas, and
Alito to lift the preliminary injunctions against the Trump Administration’s
transgender military ban—LGBTQ advocates and individuals may have lost
their potential allies.
The Supreme Court’s action in the transgender military ban case offers
an important lens for thinking about targeted discrimination against LGBTQ
persons. This is especially important in light of what appears to be a Trump
Administration mandate to curtail their rights. We predict that the Court’s
actions will signal to lower courts, Congress, and state legislatures that
discrimination against sexual minorities is permissible so long as it does not
involve marriage equality. In other words, the Court’s actions may well
presage myriad forms of discrimination not only against transgender military
service members but also everyone in the LGBTQ community. Our position
is not alarmist, but actually a call to alarm.
As we explained in this Essay, it is unusual for the Supreme Court to
lift preliminary injunctions issued by a district court.278 Moreover, doing so
often indicates that the higher court concluded that the party seeking such
relief is likely to prevail on the merits.279 We argue that because the Court
intervened and lifted the injunction, this may well reflect how it will vote on
the merits when the issue comes before it. It also may reflect a new majority
much more hostile to LGBTQ rights more generally. After all, there is no
basis for excluding transgender individuals from serving in the military other
than prejudice.
CONCLUSION
In this Essay, we argue that the transgender military ban imposed by the
Trump Administration cannot be justified on legal grounds. Nor can it be
justified based on health and safety. Finally, we show that the military ban
on transgender individuals serving in the military cannot be justified based

278

See, e.g., Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S. 1328, 1330 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983) (in
chambers) (“[A] stay application to a Circuit Justice on a matter before a court of appeals is rarely
granted.” (quoting Atiyeh v. Capps, 499 U.S. 1312, 1313 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1981) (in
chambers)).
279 To obtain a stay, among other requirements, the petitioner must show that there is a “fair
prospect that a majority of the Court will vote to reverse the judgment below.” Hollingsworth v. Perry,
558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (citing Lucas v. Townsend, 486 U.S. 1301, 1304 (Kennedy,
Circuit Justice 1988) (in chambers); Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (Brennan, Circuit
Justice 1980) (in chambers)).
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on matters of efficiency, preparedness, or combat readiness—arguments
used by President Trump to justify the military ban. Indeed, despite
transgender individuals serving openly in the military in recent years, the
Trump Administration has not been able to offer in reports or court
documents proof of its claims that transgender service members undermine
combat readiness and thus pose a risk to the military.
What is clear, however, is the use of historic tropes rooted in animus
and stereotype that have resurfaced to further discrimination. Old patterns of
discrimination and old justifications for discrimination now resurface against
LGBTQ individuals—and specifically in this case transgender service
members. The advancements in LGBTQ equality, which under the Obama
Administration were perceived as secure, now are vulnerable.
Thus, for all the civil rights advancements within the military, including
permitting African Americans to serve, banning segregation, lifting the
ceiling on women’s service, and permitting gay people to serve, prejudice
remains. One form of discrimination has given way to another. In this way,
unjustified prejudice has transformed. However, it has not been eviscerated.
This is what we might refer to as preservation through transformation.280
Professor Siegel suggests that enduring prejudices can be masked through
their transformation. Isolated, but seemingly impactful legal victories can
also produce this effect.
For example, ending slavery can be perceived as rendering equality,
when in actuality, it may not confer political or social rights. To the contrary,
ending involuntary servitude might actually lead to the creation of other
discriminatory policies and practices—which it did. Professor Siegel
explains it this way: “White Americans who emphatically opposed slavery
regularly disagreed about what it would mean to emancipate AfricanAmericans.”281 That is, “[s]ome defined freedom from slavery as equality in
civil rights; others insisted that emancipating African-Americans from
slavery entailed equality in civil and political rights; but most white
Americans who opposed slavery did not think its abolition required giving
African-Americans equality in ‘social rights.’”282 Similarly, Supreme Court
victories with regard to marriage equality or decriminalizing sodomy are not
enough to forge LGBTQ equality and may even allow people to become
complacent and prematurely believe that equality has been achieved.

280 See Siegel, supra note 16, at 1119 (“[T]he effort to disestablish the common law of marital status
transformed its structure and translated its justifications into a more contemporary gender idiom—a
reform dynamic I call ‘preservation-through-transformation.’”).
281 Id.
282 Id. at 1119–20.
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Rather, a true LGBTQ-focused civil rights agenda will not only seek to
ban prior practices of discrimination but also to advance civil rights. Yet,
advancing civil rights alone will not be sufficient without attention to
enforcement. Ultimately, promoting equality in the military will only occur
when those who wish to, and are qualified to, serve are permitted to do so
with dignity and respect.

807

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

808

